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943 
Sexual Harassment in the Post-Weinstein 
World 
Joanna L. Grossman* 
The 2017 iteration of the #MeToo movement has brought tremendous attention to the 
problem of sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as in a variety of other contexts. We 
learned that sexual harassment is rampant, varied in form, and harmful, or, more accurately, 
that it is still all of these things. Sexual harassment at work has existed as long as women 
have worked, whether paid, valued, or enslaved. The law of sexual harassment has a much 
more recent provenance. Courts began to recognize harassment as a form of sex discrimination 
in the early 1980s, and the entire current structure of sexual harassment doctrine was in place 
by the end of the 1990s. The law, in broad brush, prohibits sexual harassment in the 
workplace and gives its survivors access to a variety of remedies when the employer permits it 
to happen. Yet today, almost four decades after the law first categorized sexual misconduct as 
a form of unlawful discrimination, an average American workplace can feel remarkably like 
a saloon in the Wild West. 
This Article will explore the ways in which the #MeToo movement has affected (or 
might affect) institutional response to sexual harassment. This entails first understanding 
some early lessons from the #MeToo movement. Then, it explores the legal regime that both 
unequivocally treats harassment as prohibited and sometimes permits it to flourish. The 
Article will first consider the nature and degree of the problem, before exploring the 
development of sexual harassment law and the key components of the current legal doctrine 
designed to address misconduct. It will turn then to the ways in which existing law is 
inadequate and has largely failed to address sexual misconduct at work. It concludes with a 
consideration of whether #MeToo will push institutions harder, or at least differently, to 
respond to sexual harassment—and at what cost. In the end, it concludes that the #MeToo 
movement has brought powerful forces to bear on a problem that the law has failed to eradicate, 
but that larger problems of gender inequity will likely forestall further progress.  
 
* Ellen K. Solender Endowed Chair in Women and Law and Professor of Law, SMU Dedman 
School of Law. B.A., Amherst College; J.D., Stanford Law School. 
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“[T]he #MeToo movement is accomplishing what sexual harassment law to date has not.”+ 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2017 iteration of the #MeToo movement has brought tremendous 
attention to the problem of sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as in other 
contexts like education, media, the movie and music industries, housing, politics, 
the military, and sports.1 We learned that sexual harassment is rampant, varied in 
form, and harmful, or, more accurately, that it is still all of these things. Sexual 
harassment at work has existed as long as women have worked, whether paid, 
valued, or enslaved.2 The law of sexual harassment has a much more recent 
provenance. Courts began to recognize harassment as a form of sex discrimination 
in the early 1980s, and the entire current structure of sexual harassment doctrine 
was in place by the end of the 1990s. The law, in broad brush, prohibits sexual 
harassment in the workplace and gives its survivors access to a variety of remedies 
when the employer permits it to happen—or fails to respond appropriately when it 
does. But today, almost four decades after the law first categorized sexual 
misconduct as a form of unlawful discrimination, an average American workplace 
can feel remarkably like a saloon in the Wild West. 
This Article will explore the ways in which the #MeToo movement has 
affected (or might affect) institutional response to sexual harassment. This entails 
first understanding some early lessons from the #MeToo movement. Then, it 
 
+ Catharine A. MacKinnon, Opinion, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y. TIMES  
(Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html 
[https://perma.cc/3E9E-MCHA]. 
1. See Anna Codrea-Rado, #MeToo Floods Social Media with Stories of Harassment and Assault, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/technology/metoo-twitter-
facebook.html [https://perma.cc/G6ZD-ZKBE]. 
2. On the long history of sexual harassment of working women, see KERRY SEGRAVE, THE 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE, 1600 TO 1993 (1994). See also LIN FARLEY, 
SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB (1978). 
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explores the legal regime that both unequivocally treats harassment as prohibited 
and yet sometimes permits it to flourish. The Article will consider first the nature 
and degree of the problem, before exploring the development of sexual harassment 
law and the key components of the current legal doctrine designed to address 
misconduct. It will turn then to the ways in which existing law is inadequate and has 
largely failed to address sexual misconduct at work. It concludes with a 
consideration of whether #MeToo will push institutions harder, or at least 
differently, to respond to sexual harassment—and at what cost. In the end, it 
concludes that the #MeToo movement has brought powerful forces to bear on a 
problem that the law has failed to eradicate, but that larger problems of gender 
inequity will likely forestall further progress. 
I. SHIFTING TERRAIN: THE #METOO MOVEMENT OF 2017 
There will be many stories to tell about the year 2017—some of them  
tragic—but certainly one of the most important ones will be about the year America 
started to reckon anew with its pervasive culture of sexual misconduct. The cascade 
quite literally began with Harvey Weinstein, a Hollywood megaproducer whose 
decades of sexual predation were the subject of a hard-hitting investigative 
journalism piece published in the New York Times on October 5, 2017.3 The piece 
chronicled three decades of Weinstein’s imposing himself on actresses and others 
in the film industry in situations that could be variously characterized as threatening, 
coercive, and perverse. The story also revealed that Weinstein had entered 
confidential settlements with at least eight women who had accused him of sexual 
harassment and assault. Even more was revealed about Weinstein’s behavior in a 
New Yorker article published just a few days later.4 Together, these articles wove a 
web of misconduct, retaliation, silencing, and intimidation that might have seemed 
as farfetched as the plot of one of Weinstein’s own movies. Harvey Weinstein was 
removed from his own company and later convicted in New York of crimes related 
to sexual misconduct.5 The reporters who broke the original story won a Pulitzer 
 
3. Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Sexual Misconduct Claims Trail a Hollywood Mogul,  
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2017, at A1 [hereinafter Kantor & Twohey, Sexual Misconduct Claims Trail a Hollywood 
Mogul ]. The painstaking work that led to the publication of this story is detailed in JODI KANTOR  
& MEGAN TWOHEY, SHE SAID: BREAKING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT STORY THAT HELPED 
IGNITE A MOVEMENT (2019). 
4. See Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s Accusers 
Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2017, 10:47 AM), https://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories 
[https://perma.cc/3PVG-HF3A]. 
5. See Megan Twohey & Jodi Kantor, With Weinstein Conviction, Jury Delivers a Verdict on 
#MeToo, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/24/us/harvey-weinstein-
verdict-metoo.html [https://perma.cc/56EA-YNT2].  
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Prize for Public Service, and the rest of us received an urgent wake-up call about 
the enormity of the problem of sexual misconduct in our society.6 
Before Harvey Weinstein, there had been, among others, Roger Ailes, the 
CEO of Fox News, and Bill O’Reilly, a Fox News television host. Both men were 
terminated after revelations of serial sexual harassment of female employees, a 
pattern of conduct that was made possible in part by secret settlements along the 
way totaling tens of millions of dollars—O’Reilly personally paid thirty-two million 
dollars to a single complainant.7 But these scandals, which peaked in July 2016 and 
April 2017, respectively, dropped in and out of the news cycle with startling speed.8 
There were other cautionary tales, but they were largely ignored as well. In June 
2017, for example, the Office of the Inspector General issued a report concluding 
that sexual harassment was pervasive in the Civil Division of the U.S. Department 
of Justice and that agency leaders were handling complaints and investigations 
poorly.9 This merited only a day of news. 
The Weinstein story might well have gone the way of the Fox News ones had 
it not been for the now-famous tweet by Alyssa Milano on October 15, 2017: “If 
you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted, write ‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet.”10 
Tarana Burke, a civil rights activist, founded the Me Too campaign over a decade 
earlier through a nonprofit organization designed to help women of color who were 
the victims of sexual harassment or assault.11 Within just a few weeks of Milano’s 
 
6. See Megan Twohey & Niraj Chokshi, Company Scrambles as Weinstein Takes Leave and a 
Third of the Board Resigns, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/us/
harvey-weinstein-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/FB83-7DVK]. 
7. On the scandals at Fox News, see, for example, Joanna L. Grossman, The Potential Legal 
Train Wreck Ahead for Fox News and Bill O’Reilly, VOX (Apr. 11, 2017, 9:40 AM),  
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/4/11/15256462/fox-harassment-lawsuit-ailes-sex [https:// 
perma.cc/J7U7-7DNK]. 
8. There was commentary on these scandals, but it did not spark the same outrage that 
Weinstein’s story would just months later. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, How Unusual Is the Roger Ailes 
Sexual Harassment Case?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 10, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/08/how-unusual-
is-the-roger-ailes-sexual-harassment-case [https://perma.cc/3UHR-HGAF]; Grossman, supra note 7; 
Joanna L. Grossman & Deborah L. Rhode, Understanding Your Legal Options if You’ve Been Sexually 
Harassed, HARV. BUS. REV. ( June 22, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/understanding-your-legal-
options-if-youve-been-sexually-harassed [https://perma.cc/LNP8-TDP4] (drawing lessons from 
scandals at Uber and Fox News). 
9. See Joe Davidson, Report Finds Sloppy Handling of Sexual Misconduct Cases in Justice Department, 
WASH. POST ( June 2, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/
2017/06/02/report-finds-sloppy-handling-of-sexual-misconduct-cases-in-justice-department [https:// 
perma.cc/M3S6-H2K3]. 
10. Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milanao), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 1:21 PM), 
https://twitter.com/alyssa_milano/status/919659438700670976?lang=en [http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20210326212124/https://twitter.com/alyssa_milano/status/919659438700670976?lang=en]. 
11. See Tarana Burke, #MeToo Was Started for Black and Brown Women and Girls. They’re Still 
Being Ignored., WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2017, 5:04 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
post-nation/wp/2017/11/09/the-waitress-who-works-in-the-diner-needs-to-know-that-the-issue-of-
sexual-harassment-is-about-her-too [https://perma.cc/P2LU-YEDK]; Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman 
Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html [https://perma.cc/5EUY-WY96]. Tarana 
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tweet, the hashtag #MeToo was used millions of times in eighty-five different 
countries.12 #MeToo in English-speaking countries became #YoTambien in Spain, 
#BalanceTonPorc (“snitch out your pig”) in France, and #QuellaVoltaChe (“that 
time when”) in Italy; the King of Sweden thought it useful to “look under old 
rocks.”13 In the three years since that fateful tweet, #MeToo became more than just 
a shorthand for an incident of sexual harassment; it morphed into a  
social movement. 
After Weinstein was outed, hardly a day went by over many months without 
news of another powerful man’s downfall—and a trail of victims telling their  
long-hidden stories of working for these men under conditions that were, at best, 
discriminatory and oppressive, and, at worst, downright dangerous. Almost 
immediately, the story had two pieces—the allegations and the consequences. 
Public-radio celebrity Garrison Keillor was among those who fell from power.14 So 
was Judge Alex Kozinski, a federal appellate judge who retired suddenly after fifteen 
women, including several former clerks, made allegations of sexual misconduct; by 
voluntarily leaving the bench, he avoided a formal inquiry into the alleged 
misconduct.15 A controversial case involved Democratic Senator Al Franken, who 
 
Burke told the reporter that she panicked and “felt a sense of dread, because something that was part 
of my life’s work was going to be co-opted and taken from me and used for a purpose that I hadn’t 
originally intended.” Id. But she accepted Alyssa Milano’s explanation that she hadn’t known of the 
earlier use of the phrase, and the two women moved forward together to create a network of resources 
for survivors. See Melissa Chan, ‘Now the Work Really Begins.’ Alyssa Milano and Tarana Burke on 
What’s Next for the #MeToo Movement, TIME (Dec. 6, 2017, 8:24 AM), https://time.com/5051822/
time-person-year-alyssa-milano-tarana-burke/ [https://perma.cc/MKR3-PG3V]. 
12. See Catherine Powell, Opinion, How #MeToo Has Spread like Wildfire Around the World, 
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 15, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/how-metoo-has-spread-wildfire-
around-world-749171 [https://perma.cc/2ZWK-6GHZ] (describing the global reaction to the 
#MeToo message). 
13. Id. 
14. Jayme Deerwester, Garrison Keillor Scandal: ‘Washington Post’ Drops His Syndicated 
Columns, USA TODAY (Nov. 30, 2017, 2:27 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/
2017/11/30/garrison-keillor-remains-defiant-statement-his-firing/908352001/ [https://perma.cc/
KF9Z-HBTR] (reporting that Keillor was fired by Minnesota Public Radio and several newspapers 
dropped his syndicated columns after inappropriate behavior was alleged). 
15. See Molly Olmstead, Judge Kozinski Steps Down in the Face of Multiple Sexual Harassment 
Allegations, SLATE (Dec. 18, 2017, 10:46 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/12/9th-
circuit-judge-alex-kozinski-resigns-following-multiple-allegations-of-sexual-harassment.html [https://
perma.cc/4JQ5-FMZG]; Cristiano Lima, Federal Appeals Court Judge Steps Down Amid Sexual 
Misconduct Probe, POLITICO (Dec. 18, 2017, 10:28 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/
18/alex-kozinski-retire-sexual-misconduct-allegations-302251 [https://perma.cc/927P-CTFZ]. The 
fall of Judge Kozinski was the subject of many news articles, as well as the focus of women seeking 
greater accountability in the judiciary. See also Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex 
Kozinski Accused of Sexual Misconduct, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017, 2:27 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/prominent-appeals-court-judge-alex-kozinski-
accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/08/1763e2b8-d913-11e7-a841-2066faf731ef_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/KF5E-RPXV] (reporting first on allegations against Kozinski); Dahlia Lithwick, He 
Made Us All Victims and Accomplices, SLATE (Dec. 13, 2017, 3:11 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2017/12/judge-alex-kozinski-made-us-all-victims-and-accomplices.html [https://perma.cc/ 
GNC6-5L6N] (giving a first-person account of the subtle but coercive ways in which Kozinski imposed 
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resigned from the U.S. Senate under pressure after an allegation of mildly 
inappropriate behavior, and New York Governor Andrew Cuomo was on 
tenterhooks in early 2021, as several woman came forward with accusations of 
sexual misconduct.16 A New York Times article that ran in December 2017 profiled 
forty-seven firings in just the first six weeks after the Weinstein bombshell 
dropped.17 The information ran as a table, listing name, accusation, fallout, and 
response. Documentary filmmaker Morgan Spurlock was accused of sexual 
harassment and rape; he stepped down from his production company, and he 
acknowledged he was “not some innocent bystander” in the sexual harassment 
crisis.18 Chef Mario Batali was accused of inappropriate touching; he was fired by 
ABC and stepped away voluntarily from his businesses, and he was “deeply sorry 
for any pain, humiliation or discomfort” that he caused his peers.19 Matt Lauer, the 
cohost of The Today Show, was accused of sexual assault; he was fired by NBC, and 
while claiming that some of the reporting was “untrue or mischaracterized,” Lauer 
conceded there was “enough truth in these stories to make me feel embarrassed and 
ashamed.”20 The list goes on and included, notably, U.S. Representative John 
Conyers Jr., television personality Charlie Rose, comedian Louis C.K., actor Kevin 
Spacey, and NPR news honcho Michael Oreskes.21 Republican Congressman Trent 
Franks resigned after disclosure that he had tried to pay two different legislative 
 
himself on women and the “strange hypersexualized world of transgressive talk and action that 
embodied his chambers”); Vivia Chen, Can We Get Rid of Alex Kozinski?, CAREERIST (Dec. 13, 2017, 
10:16 AM), https://thecareerist.typepad.com/thecareerist/2017/12/does-kozinski-have-to-go.html 
[https://perma.cc/WD6N-SCAT]. 
16. See Amber Phillips, Al Franken’s Defiant, Unapologetic Resignation Speech, Annotated,  
WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2017, 9:58 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/
12/07/al-frankens-defiant-unapologetic-resignation-speech-annotated [https://perma.cc/7NEF-
7A7W]. As these events unfolded, I wrote about them in an online column. See, e.g., Joanna  
L. Grossman, Reflections on America’s Reckoning with Sexual Harassment, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Dec. 19, 
2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/12/19/reflections-americas-reckoning-sexual-harassment 
[https://perma.cc/TCY9-HWES]; Joanna L. Grossman, The Aftermath of the #MeToo Movement, 
JUSTIA: VERDICT ( June 26, 2018), https://verdict.justia.com/2018/06/26/the-aftermath-of-the-
metoo-movement [https://perma.cc/XE58-VMG7]; Joanna L. Grossman, Dear Harvey: You Are the 
Spark that Started the #MeToo Movement, JUSTIA: VERDICT ( Jan. 14, 2020), https://verdict.justia.com/
2020/01/14/dear-harvey-you-are-the-spark-that-started-the-metoo-movement [https://perma.cc/ 
C25V-VKXV]. On Andrew Cuomo, see Luis Ferré-Sadurní & Mihir Zaveri, Sexual Harassment Claims 
Against Cuomo: What We Know So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
article/cuomo-sexual-harassment-nursing-homes-covid-19.html [https://perma.cc/VP5K-F4G6]. 
17. Sarah Almukhtar, Michael Gold & Larry Buchanan, After Weinstein: 71 Men Accused of 
Sexual Misconduct and Their Fall from Power, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2017/11/10/us/men-accused-sexual-misconduct-weinstein.html [https://perma.cc/8WFS-RV9C] 
(Feb. 8, 2018). 
18. Id. 
19. Jill Disis, Mario Batali Steps Away from Business, TV Show amid Sexual Misconduct 
Allegations, CNN (Dec. 11, 2017, 2:26 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/11/media/mario-
batali-sexual-misconduct-allegations/index.html [https://perma.cc/JV3H-Z8V7]. 
20. Almukhtar et al., supra note 17. 
21. Id.; see also Maria Puente, Kevin Spacey Scandal: A Complete List of the 15 Accusers, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 16, 2017, 12:04 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/2017/11/07/kevin-
spacey-scandal-complete-list-13-accusers/835739001/ [https://perma.cc/P44V-RHSF]. 
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aides five million dollars to have sex with him, get pregnant, and carry the pregnancy 
to term as a surrogate for him and his wife.22 Investigative journalists dove deep 
into stories of individual men and their sexualized reigns.23 Stories were written not 
just about individuals but also about companies and entire industries.24 But the most 
revealing work has focused on individuals. A more recent study found that 417 
high-profile executives and employees, from across the American labor force, were 
accused of harassment in the first eighteen months after the Weinstein bomb was 
dropped.25 To make this list, a harasser had to merit at least seven national news 
mentions for sexual harassment—a mark of the person’s notoriety and interest to 
the public.26 The list includes celebrities, to be sure, but most entrants are high-level 
executives—a surprising number of CEOs—who are not household names. The 
organizations that housed fallen men spanned many sectors of the  
economy—entertainment, finance, law, politics, journalism, etc. NPR and Fox 
News were equally implicated, as were high-profile donors and members from both 
major political parties. According to a database maintained by Temin and Company, 
between October 2017 and April 2019, more than 1,200 high-profile figures were 
publicly accused of sexual misconduct, half of whom lost their jobs as a result.27 
Ninety-seven percent of the accused perpetrators were male.28 
 
22. See Katie Rogers, Trent Franks, Accused of Offering $5 Million to Aide for Surrogacy, Resigns, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/08/us/politics/trent-franks-sexual-
surrogacy-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/3RYD-BAU9]. 
23. See, e.g., Katie Benner, At the Justice Dept.’s Death Penalty Unit, Accusations of Favoritism, 
Gender Bias and Unwanted Groping, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/
31/us/politics/justice-department-harassment-bias.html [https://perma.cc/4GEV-PYRQ] (reporting 
 on the head of the Justice Department’s death penalty unit, Kevin Carwile, who groped at least one 
woman and “fostered a culture of favoritism and sexism” in his unit); Tom Bartlett & Nell  
Gluckman, She Left Harvard. He Got to Stay., CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 27, 2018), https://
www.chronicle.com/article/she-left-harvard-he-got-to-stay [https://perma.cc/J52T-HGQ3]. 
24. See, e.g., The Young Law. Ed. Bd. of the Am. Law., YL Board: This Is What Sexual 
Harassment in the Legal Industry Looks like, LAW.COM: AM. LAW. (Feb. 28, 2018, 10:37 AM), https://
www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/02/28/yl-board-this-is-what-sexual-harassment-in-the-legal-
industry-looks-like [https://perma.cc/53RQ-8YHN]; Bethany McLean, “We All Wear All Black 
Every Day”: Inside Wall Street’s Complex, Shameful, and Often Confidential Battle with #MeToo, VANITY 
FAIR: HIVE (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/02/inside-wall-street-complex-
shameful-and-often-confidential-battle-with-metoo [https://perma.cc/A763-DLL6]; Julie Creswell, 
Kevin Draper & Rachel Abrams, At Nike, Revolt Led by Women Leads to Exodus of Male Executives, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/28/business/nike-women.html 
[https://perma.cc/SJJ2-FFKR]. 
25. Jeff Green, #MeToo Snares More than 400 High-Profile People, BLOOMBERG | QUINT ( June 
28, 2018, 4:16 AM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/-metoo-snares-more-than-400-high-
profile-people-as-firings-rise [https://perma.cc/4QWK-LCSF]. 
26. Id. 
27. Deborah L. Rhode, #MeToo: Why Now? What Next?, 69 DUKE L.J. 377, 395 n.101 (2019) 
(citing E-mail from Davia B. Temin, CEO, Temin & Co., Inc., to Deborah L. Rhode, Professor of  
L., Stanford Univ. (Apr. 29, 2019)). 
28.  Id. 
Second to Printer_Grossman.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/4/21  1:13 PM 
950 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:943 
Although the firings of particular high-profile men occupied the news for 
many months, they represented the launch of something much larger.29 The news 
of the firings was eye-catching but also mind-numbing at a certain point. The 
continuous string prompted many to question whether there was an epidemic of 
sexual harassment. The fact is, however, that harassment was pervasive before the 
public became aware that it was. Sexual harassment has been a constant problem in 
the American workplace, as well as in virtually all other sectors of society, as far 
back as we look. As discussed below, the term “sexual harassment” dates only to 
the late 1970s when a popular women’s magazine, Redbook, published results of a 
survey in 1976, entitled “What Men Do to Women on the Job,” which found sexual 
comments and advances to be pervasive in the workplace.30 A series of federal 
surveys beginning in 1981 reported that four in ten female federal employees 
experienced harassing behaviors in any given two-year period; this rate  
never budged, even as law and social norms developed in opposition to  
sexual harassment.31 
Several components of the modern story are “new,” however. First, people 
who have experienced sexual harassment have demonstrated more willingness to 
report their experiences, whether informally on social media or through more 
formal avenues. This is notable because studies have repeatedly shown that targets 
of harassment rarely file formal complaints.32 As an empirical matter, complaining 
is the least likely response of a woman to an incident of sexual harassment at work.33 
This is especially true for harassment that is not (or has not yet become) severe.34 
Filing a complaint is an option victims choose only after exhausting all other 
avenues.35 For women who forego complaining, it is often because they (rightly) 
fear retaliation from the harasser or their workplace, and they often worry about 
 
29. One important question triggered by these firings is about when and under what 
circumstances these disgraced men should be permitted back into our collective good graces. Another 
is about what inquiry and analysis should come next. See, e.g., The Times Ed. Bd., Opinion,  
Editorial: Alex Kozinski’s Retirement Doesn’t End the Discussion About Sexual Harassment in the 
Judiciary, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-
kozinski-harass-20171219-story.html [https://perma.cc/8L9B-DQYB] (drawing a lesson from the 
Kozinski saga that “some influential people will abuse their power to take advantage of women (and 
men) who are dependent on them for their livelihoods and professional advancement” and concluding 
that the judiciary and “its leaders should join the rest of society in making sure its workplaces are safe 
for all”). 
30. Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job: A Shocking Look at Sexual Harassment, 
REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 149, 217–23. 
31. OFF. OF MERIT SYS. REV. & STUD., U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN 
THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 36 (1981) [hereinafter USMSPB 1981]. 
32. Infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
33. Infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
34.  L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 
82 IND. L.J. 711, 731 (2007). 
35.  Louise F. Fitzgerald, Suzanne Swan & Karla Fischer, Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? The 
Psychological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 117, 
121 (1995). 
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being socially ostracized at work and even about damaging the harasser’s career.36 
At the same time, victims tend to feel that complaining is futile—that no action will 
be taken that will make the victim’s situation better.37 The lack of hope for 
successful redress provides little by way of counterweight against the justifiable fear 
of adverse consequences.38 But something has changed. Despite the powerful 
deterrents to speaking out, women are coming forward, in droves, to tell their 
stories. It’s hard to explain why that moment is now, but the dam broke. And once 
it did, the flood commenced—a “mass mobilization against sexual abuse,” in 
Catharine MacKinnon’s words, “through an unprecedented wave of speaking out 
in conventional and social media.”39 Stories beget more stories; complaints beget 
more complaints. There’s a contagion to the storytelling and perceived safety in 
numbers. It could be the power of the anti-Trump resistance movement, which has 
mobilized women around the country to organize, protest, and stand up for 
themselves. It could be the raunchy and disturbing nature of the allegations in the 
first few stories to break. It could be that the victimization of celebrities, at the 
hands of Harvey Weinstein and James Toback, among other perpetrators, brought 
the issue into our consciousness more clearly. It could be some combination of 
these factors. But whatever the catalyst, there can be no doubt that this chorus of 
voices, speaking out against sexual misconduct, is noteworthy. Many of the 
accusations are based on behavior from the past—a natural flood-letting after years 
during which victims stayed silent and employers swept credible complaints under 
the rug in order to preserve the harasser’s career or avoid a hit to the institution’s 
reputation. Accusations were at their highest in November 2017, just one month 
after the Weinstein story broke.40 Although that initial surge is over, complaints 
continue at higher rates than before. We can expect higher rates of complaint—and 
discipline—to continue because the current climate has made it safer for victims to 
complain and less safe for employers to ignore. 
Second, technology and social media have greatly amplified the voices of 
accusers. It goes without saying that being able to share one’s story via Facebook or 
Twitter has the potential for much more rapid and widespread dissemination than 
an in-person conversation, a telephone call, or even an email or text message. But 
it’s not just the technological capability that is different; it is also the way we use it. 
The very nature of how we share details of our lives today has changed the 
experience of scandal, trauma, healing, and retribution. The Internet is a great 
connector, helping us all find those who share some views, beliefs, or experiences 
or whose lives intersect with ours in some way. For most of world history, people 
lived their lives in small, intimate circles. Face-to-face contacts were the limits of 
their world. No longer. The Internet means that survivors can find one another, 
 
36. Id. at 122-123. 
37. Id. at 127. 
38. Id. at 123. 
39. MacKinnon, supra note +. 
40. Green, supra note 25 (citing data regarding accusations from the company Temin & Co.). 
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and those interested in their stories can find them, too—journalists, advocates, 
lawyers, and trolls can all zero in on the latest complaints. The age of social media 
also reflects a turn away from privacy more generally, a time when people share 
information about themselves that they once would have worked hard to conceal. 
In addition to the general power of viral messaging in the age of the Internet, the 
#MeToo movement has given rise to new ways of sharing information specifically 
about sexual misconduct—a scattered warning system of sorts. In addition to the 
many revelations posted on Facebook and Twitter, women have populated a variety 
of other data-gathering sites with their experiences. An app called Blind permits 
users to share information anonymously about sexual misconduct in a particular 
workplace; Glassdoor provides the ability to search anonymous employee reviews.41 
Several industries have seen the creation of open-source spreadsheets where 
limitless numbers of people can share their harassment experience. “Shitty media 
men” was the first of the genre—people who had experienced harassment in media 
could enter their information in a table for all to see—but other industries have 
similar opportunities to anonymously share experiences. The spreadsheet for sexual 
harassers in academia has almost 1,900 detailed entries of harassment.42 Clearly, 
some of the stories resonated with survivors who had kept silent until now but were 
now moved to share in very public ways. The sharing is a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand, it forced women to realize that they, collectively, “live under threat. 
Not sometimes, but all the time.”43 On the other, they might realize they are not 
alone. Monica Lewinsky, arguably the Internet’s first victim, reflected on how 
differently her experience might have been in the age of social media: “If the 
Internet was a bête noire to me in 1998, its stepchild—social media—has been a 
savior for millions of women today . . . . Virtually anyone can share her or his 
 
41. See Dinah Brin, Social Media Is a Major Consideration in Wave of Sexual Harassment 
Allegations, SHRM (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/ 
technology/pages/social-media-major-consideration-in-wave-of-sexual-harassment-allegations.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/XQ49-GFPD]. 
42. See Constance Grady, Shitty Media Men List Creator Moira Donegan on the Year in #MeToo, 
VOX (Oct. 16, 2018, 11:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/10/16/17955392/moira-
donegan-interview-me-too-shitty-media-men-list [https://perma.cc/DN8T-KH7V]; Moira Donegan, 
I Started the Media Men List, CUT ( Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/01/moira-donegan-
i-started-the-media-men-list.html [https://perma.cc/9ENT-J2DG]; see also Karen Kelsky, A 
Crowdsourced Survey of Sexual Harassment in the Academy, THE PROFESSOR IS IN (Dec. 1, 2017), https:/
/theprofessorisin.com/2017/12/01/a-crowdsourced-survey-of-sexual-harassment-in-the-academy/ 
[https://perma.cc/P4Q4-RJK9] (linking a crowdsourced survey of sexual harassment in the academy 
available at: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1S9KShDLvU7C-KkgEevYTHXr3F6In 
TenrBsS9yk-8C5M/edit#gid=1530077352 [http://web.archive.org/web/20190112070836if_/https: 
//docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1S9KShDLvU7C-KkgEevYTHXr3F6InTenrBsS9yk-8C5M/edit 
#gid=1530077352 ]). On sexual harassment in academia and whisper networks, see Jennifer L. Airey, 
#MeToo, 37 TULSA STUD. WOMEN’S LITERATURE 7, 8 (2018). 
43. Barbara Kingsolver, Opinion, #MeToo Isn’t Enough. Now Women Need to Get Ugly, 
GUARDIAN ( Jan. 16, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/16/
metoo-women-daughters-harassment-powerful-men [https://perma.cc/FUG3-RKPV]. 
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#MeToo story and be instantly welcomed into a tribe.”44 Regardless of the 
consequences for individual victims, the widespread sharing and connecting is an 
essential feature of the #MeToo movement. Voices in chorus became a “hashtag, a 
movement, a reckoning,” and the “Silence Breakers” were selected as Time 
magazine’s Person of the Year for 2017.45 
Collective communication led to some new forms of collective action. The 
initial revelations of harassment led to the creation of Time’s Up, a fund to pay for 
legal representation of sexual misconduct victims—created by celebrities but 
designed for the benefit of ordinary workers.46 The name reflects the conclusion 
that the “clock has run out on sexual assault, harassment and inequality in the 
workplace. It’s time to do something about it.”47 A former lawyer from a top firm 
that had a played a role in protecting Harvey Weinstein from consequences for his 
sexual misconduct left her practice to launch the Purple Campaign, the mission of 
which is “to end the systemic problem of workplace sexual harassment that exists 
across every industry in the United States.”48 And the wide dissemination of 
harassment stories has led directly to action by individual companies as well. For 
example, Susan Fowler, a site reliability engineer at Uber, wrote a 3,000-word essay 
about harassment she experienced at the company; her words went viral and led to 
the ouster of the company’s CEO and about twenty other employees who had been 
accused of harassment or other types of misconduct.49 
Third, men with credible accusations of harassment against them are being 
punished. The general history has been to the contrary; employers have largely 
 
44. Monica Lewinsky, Monica Lewinsky: Emerging from “The House of Gaslight” in the Age of 
#MeToo, VANITY FAIR: HIVE (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/02/monica-
lewinsky-in-the-age-of-metoo [https://perma.cc/BZ6N-43BJ ]. 
45. Edward Felsenthal, The Choice, TIME (Dec. 18, 2017), https://time.com/time-person-of-
the-year-2017-silence-breakers-choice/ [https://perma.cc/28TM-SNMK]. 
46. TIME’S UP, https://timesupnow.org [https://perma.cc/VQA4-QWF8] (last visited  
Mar. 30, 2021). 
47. Id. The fund is behind a current harassment lawsuit against McDonald’s restaurants. See 
Melena Ryzik, In a Test of Their Power, #MeToo’s Legal Forces Take on McDonald’s, N.Y. TIMES (May  
21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/business/mcdonalds-female-employees-sexual-
harassment.html [https://perma.cc/D4Q8-RBRK]. 
48. Ally Coll Steele, Why I Left My Corporate Legal Job to Work Full-Time on #MeToo,  
WASH. POST ( Jan. 25, 2018, 9:02 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/
2018/01/25/why-i-left-my-corporate-legal-job-to-work-full-time-on-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4RUP-5ZYD]; see Meghan Tribe, Ex-Boies Schiller Associate Launches Campaign to End Sexual 
Harassment, LAW.COM: AM. LAW. ( Jan. 29, 2018, 5:59 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/
sites/americanlawyer/2018/01/29/ex-boies-schiller-associate-launches-campaign-to-end-sexual-
harassment/ [https://perma.cc/FD8Z-K4DZ]. Information about the campaign can be found at 
PURPLE CAMPAIGN, http://purplecampaign.org [https://perma.cc/SM4V-M9Q2] ( last visited  
Apr. 2, 2021). 
49. Johana Bhuiyan, With Just Her Words, Susan Fowler Brought Uber to Its Knees,  
VOX: RECODE (Dec. 6, 2017, 5:16 PM), https://www.vox.com/2017/12/6/16680602/susan-fowler-
uber-engineer-recode-100-diversity-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/ZY8L-ATUE]; see Susan 
Fowler, Opinion, I Wrote the Uber Memo. This Is How to End Sexual Harassment., N.Y. TIMES  
(April 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/opinion/metoo-susan-fowler-forced-
arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/8TFM-WLDU]. 
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underreacted to credible evidence of harassment. Some of their inaction can be 
explained by the infrequency of complaints. But, as discussed in more detail below, 
even when they do investigate complaints, employers tend to be biased against 
finding evidence of discrimination and to recast complaints of discrimination as a 
problem of interpersonal conflicts that might merit an intervention other than 
discipline. Moreover, when the accused is a high-value employee, employers have 
tended to weigh the cost of losing an asset in the calculation about how to respond.50 
Severe discipline, however, has been a central element of the #MeToo stories since 
2017. “Now, all at once,” Barbara Kingsolver wrote, “women are refusing to accept 
sexual aggression as any kind of award, and men are getting fired from their jobs. 
It feels like an earthquake.”51 When Jeffrey Toobin exposed himself on a Zoom call, 
he was suspended from his position at the New Yorker, even though the timing 
could not have been worse—two weeks before the presidential election, for which 
he was a leading national commentator.52 His experience was relatively typical of 
the new era. Of the 417 men profiled in the study mentioned above, sixty percent 
were fired, and some others were subjected to formal repercussions that fell short 
of firing.53 Some corporations have been spurred to name women to replace fallen 
men; others have taken responsibility for better vetting of executives.54 As author 
Lindy West wrote in a New York Times op-ed, 
One of the most breathtaking things about #MeToo—just behind the 
iron-jawed fury of its deponents—is how swiftly and decisively it pulled 
conversations about sexual predation from the conceptual to the concrete. 
After decades of debates and doubts and dissertations and settlements and 
nondisclosure agreements and whisper networks and stasis and silence, all 
of a sudden, in one great gust, powerful men are toppling. Talk has become 
action. The seemingly untouchable have lost jobs, reputations and legacies 
 
50. To take just one example of this calculus, the Office of the Inspector General found that 
the Civil Division of the Justice Department reviewed harassment complaints from 2011 to 2016 and 
found “examples of lower-level workers being punished more harshly than upper-level officials for 
similar offenses.” Davidson, supra note 9. In one case, the official in charge of the investigation wrote 
that a senior attorney found to have groped the breasts and butts of two female attorneys, and who had 
been previously reprimanded for “unwelcome sexual and offensive comments,” suffered no 
punishment for the physical assaults because a suspension “would unnecessarily deprive the 
government of [his] litigating services.” Id. 
51. Kingsolver, supra note 43. 
52. Johnny Diaz & Azi Paybarah, New Yorker Suspends Jeffrey Toobin After Zoom Incident,  
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/19/business/media/jeffrey-toobin-
new-yorker-suspended.html [https://perma.cc/VP9F-MEFL]. 
53. See Green, supra note 25; see also MacKinnon, supra note + (“No longer liars, no longer 
worthless, today’s survivors are initiating consequences none of them could have gotten through any 
lawsuit—in part because the laws do not permit relief against individual perpetrators, but more because 
they are being believed and valued as the law seldom has.”). 
54. See, e.g., Paige Smith, Boards Rely on Intense Vetting for New Leaders After #MeToo, 
BLOOMBERG L. ( Jan. 11, 2019, 3:03 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/
boards-rely-on-intense-vetting-for-new-leaders-after-metoo [https://perma.cc/5QVQ-7EWN]. 
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overnight. Choices have consequences, even if you are Harvey Weinstein. 
This is new.55 
The increase in consequences is evidence that institutions are taking 
harassment complaints more seriously, but the reliance on firing as the only 
appropriate response breeds resistance to the movement and, as discussed below, 
potentially harms women in other ways. 
Fourth, as the dust has settled on the initial flurry of scandals, some suspicious 
institutional practices have emerged. Many of the highest-profile harassers 
(including Weinstein, Ailes, and O’Reilly) relied on settlements with nondisclosure 
agreements (NDAs) to resolve complaints quietly and permit the perpetrator to 
retain a position of power.56 NDAs have long played an important role in the 
settlement of certain kinds of disputes, but they appear to have played a more 
sinister role in these cases.57 These clauses in settlements exacerbate the much larger 
effect of forced arbitration, which allows employers to avoid public lawsuits and 
control many aspects of the external dispute resolution process.58 In some cases, 
employers were paying out settlements in order to resolve questions about their 
liability, but in others, the men themselves were paying off accusers directly.59 In 
cases involving public officials, taxpayers were funding settlements.60 News stories 
revealed that in some cases, employers were footing the bill to quietly settle 
harassment lawsuits, and in others, the men themselves were paying off accusers.61 
 
55. Lindy West, Opinion, We Got Rid of Some Bad Men. Now Let’s Get Rid of Bad Movies., 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/03/opinion/sunday/we-got-rid-of-
some-bad-men-now-lets-get-rid-of-bad-movies.html [https://perma.cc/NM6A-8BQ3]. 
56. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, A Long-Delayed Reckoning of the Cost of Silence on Abuse,  
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/business/media/a-long-
delayed-reckoning-of-the-cost-of-silence-on-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/3YWF-MX3D] (exploring 
the ways in which Bill O’Reilly, Harvey Weinstein, Bill Cosby, and others were able to keep “their 
alleged misconduct under wraps with the help of the nondisclosure agreements included as part of the 
numerous out-of-court settlements that allowed them to admit to no wrongdoing”). 
57. See generally Vasundhara Prasad, Note, If Anyone Is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking the Culture 
of Silence Around Sexual Abuse Through Regulating Non-Disclosure Agreements and Secret Settlements, 59 
B.C. L. REV. 2507 (2018). 
58. See generally Kathleen McCullough, Note, Mandatory Arbitration and Sexual Harassment 
Claims: #MeToo- and Time’s Up-Inspired Action Against the Federal Arbitration Act, 87 FORDHAM  
L. REV. 2653 (2019); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in 
Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155 (2019). 
59. E.g. Emily Steel & Michael Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Settled New Harassment Claim, Then Fox 
Renewed His Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
10/21/business/media/bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/T5PZ-S2YR]. 
60. See Jen Fifield, Stateline, Why Taxpayers Pay When Legislators are Accused of Sexual Misconduct, 
PBS (Feb. 8, 2018, 10:25 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/why-taxpayers-pay-when-
legislators-are-accused-of-sexual-misconduct [https://perma.cc/YAD2-DLUJ]. 
61. See, e.g., Katie Rogers & Kenneth P. Vogel, Congressman Combating Harassment Settled His 
Own Misconduct Case, N.Y. TIMES ( Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/20/us/
politics/patrick-meehan-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/B6DN-DCTX] (reporting that 
Patrick Meehan, a Republican member of Congress from Pennsylvania, used office funds to settle a 
sexual harassment complaint from an aide). After several scandals along these same lines, the  
U.S. House of Representatives voted to change its policies on harassment in part by banning the use of 
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Silence may also have been achieved through more aggressive means. Harvey 
Weinstein worked with a cadre of “enablers, silencers, and spies” to gather dirt that 
might be used to undermine any known or future accusers.62 Because of these 
techniques, some men who engaged in serious misconduct were protected from 
consequences and permitted to retain positions of power in which they could 
continue to misbehave.63 In other cases, institutions contributed to the problem by 
removing a perpetrator from their ranks without disclosing any damaging 
information. The harasser is then able to seek a new position unencumbered by 
accusations or findings of misconduct. This game of “pass the trash” is more 
common in some industries than others, but seems to play a significant role in 
academia and in the legal profession. These individual and institutional practices 
have already been targeted by some state legislatures in the wake of #MeToo, as 
they consider legal reforms that might better prevent or redress sexual misconduct.64 
These initial observations about the impact of the #MeToo movement lead to 
broader questions about whether it will lead to more permanent changes. The 
sections that follow will explore the nature and extent of sexual harassment in 
workplaces today before analyzing the way in which the law’s current approach has 
shaped the behavior of individuals and institutions. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF HARASSMENT: THEN AND (STILL) NOW 
Sexual harassment has been a persistent plague on working women. Experts 
began surveying workers about the nature and prevalence of the problem in the late 
1970s and continue to do so today. Since the original surveys, workers—mostly 
women—have reported relatively high rates of harassment. In the first major 
systematic workplace study, conducted by the United States Merit Systems 
Protection Board and published in 1981, four in ten female respondents reported 
experiencing at least one incident of harassment in the two years prior to the 
 
taxpayer funds to settle cases. See Natalie Andrews, House Passes Sexual-Harassment Revamp, WALL  
ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2018 3:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-passes-sexual-harassment-revamp-
1517945933 [https://web.archive.org/web/20180527064932/https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-
passes-sexual-harassment-revamp-1517945933 ]. 
62. Megan Twohey, Jodi Kantor, Susan Dominus, Jim Rutenberg & Steve Eder, Weinstein’s 
Complicity Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/05/
us/harvey-weinstein-complicity.html [https://perma.cc/4JX5-JKUZ]; see also Ronan Farrow, Harvey 
Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-secret-settlements [https://perma.cc/YU5T-P9S6]. 
63. On the role of NDAs in harassment cases, see Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 
71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76 ( 2018), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/
2018/06/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-Ayres-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYZ3-NR6B]. 
64. See generally Anna North, 7 Positive Changes that Have Come from the #MeToo Movement, 
VOX (Oct. 4, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/10/4/20852639/me-too-
movement-sexual-harassment-law-2019 [https://perma.cc/L3F7-RU8H]. 
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survey.65 Subsequent studies have revealed similar or even higher rates  
of harassment.66 
Researchers who study sexual harassment use three categories to measure and 
study the underlying behaviors that might be labeled “sexual harassment.”67 The 
following definition of harassment is consistent with social science measures as well 
as the legal definition: 
Sexual harassment (a form of discrimination) is composed of three 
categories of behavior: (1) gender harassment (verbal and nonverbal 
behaviors that convey hostility, objectification, exclusion, or second-class 
status about members of one gender), (2) unwanted sexual attention (verbal 
or physical unwelcome sexual advances, which can include assault), and (3) 
sexual coercion (when favorable professional or educational treatment is 
conditioned on sexual activity). Harassing behavior can be either direct 
(targeted at an individual) or ambient (a general level of sexual harassment 
in an environment).68 
Surveys designed to measure the frequency and type of sexual harassment set 
forth a list of behaviors. The list used in a 2016 survey of federal employees is typical 
of the approach used since 1981, when the first comprehensive surveys were 
conducted and after sexual harassment became actionable under federal 
antidiscrimination law:69 
• Gender Harassment 
o  Derogatory or unprofessional terms related to sex or gender 
o Unwelcome sexual teasing, jokes, comments or questions 
o Exposure to sexually oriented material (e.g., photos, videos, 
written material) 
o Exposure to sexually oriented conversations 
 
 
65. USMSPB 1981, supra note 31, at 36. 
66. See generally OFF. OF POL’Y & EVALUATION, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: AN UPDATE (1988) [hereinafter USMSPB 1988];  
OFF. OF POL’Y & EVALUATION, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, AND CONTINUING CHALLENGES 13 (1995) [hereinafter USMSPB 
1995] (updating surveys from 1981 and 1988); OFF. OF POL’Y & EVALUATION, U.S. MERIT  
SYS. PROT. BD., UPDATE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE  
3–4 (2018) [hereinafter USMSPB 2018 ], https://www.mspb.gov/MSPBSEARCH/viewdocs.aspx? 
docnumber=1500639&version=1506232&application=ACROBAT [https://perma.cc/C6S5-6XPU] 
(reporting results of 2016 survey). 
67. Louise F. Fitzgerald, Michele J. Gelfand & Fritz Drasgow, Measuring Sexual  
Harassment: Theoretical and Psychometric Advances, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 425, 430 (1995). 
68. THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF  
WOMEN: CLIMATE, CULTURE, AND CONSEQUENCES IN ACADEMIC SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND 
MEDICINE 18 (Paula A. Johnson, Sheila E. Widnall & Frazier F. Benya eds., 2018)  
[hereinafter NASEM]. 
69. See, e.g., USMSPB 1981, supra note 31, at 34; USMSPB 1988, supra note 66; USMSPB 1995, 
supra note 66, at 5 (updating surveys from 1981 and 1988); NAVY PERS. RSCH. & DEV. CTR., U.S. NAVY, 
NPRDC-TR-92-11, ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE NAVY: RESULTS OF THE 1989 
NAVY-WIDE SURVEY (1992). 
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•  Unwanted Sexual Attention 
o Unwelcome invasion of personal space (e.g., touching, crowding, 
leaning over) 
o Unwelcome communications (e.g., emails, phone calls, text 
messages, social media contacts) of a sexual nature 
o Unwelcome sexually suggestive looks or gestures 
•  Sexual Coercion 
o Offer of preferential treatment in the workplace in exchange for 
sexual favors 
o Pressure for sexual favors 
o Pressure for dates 
o Stalking (e.g., unwanted physical or electronic intrusion in your 
personal life) 
o Sexual assault or attempted sexual assault70 
Researchers have studied sexual harassment since the late 1970s,71 and, as 
explained in Part III, the legal definition has been more or less the same since the 
Supreme Court endorsed in 1986 a definition of actionable harassment that the 
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) had established in 1980.72 
Although there have been some changes over time, the key characteristics of sexual 
harassment in the workplace have held steady. Women are much more likely to be 
sexually harassed than men and to experience it more frequently.73 As Tarana Burke 
emphasized, women of color are disproportionately likely to be targets of sexual 
harassment yet are less likely to be able to enforce their legal rights.74 Women of 
color often experience harassment that has both sexual and racial components, and 
courts are notoriously hostile to complex and hybrid claims.75 
 
70. USMSPB 2018, supra note 66, at 2. 
71. For detailed information about prevalence studies, see JEANETTE N. CLEVELAND, 
MARGARET STOCKDALE & KEVIN R. MURPHY, WOMEN AND MEN IN ORGANIZATIONS: SEX AND 
GENDER ISSUES AT WORK 230–33, 231 tbl.9.2 (2000). 
72. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) 
(1980); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
73. USMSPB 1995, supra note 66, at 13; USMSPB 2018, supra note 66. See generally Vicki  
J. Magley, Charles L. Hulin, Louise F. Fitzgerald & Mary DeNardo, Outcomes of Self-Labeling Sexual 
Harassment, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 390 (1999); Remus Ilies, Nancy Hauserman, Susan Schwochau  
& John Stibal, Reported Incidence Rates of Work-Related Sexual Harassment in the United States: Using 
Meta-Analysis to Explain Reported Rate Disparities, 56 PERS. PSYCH. 607, 623 (2003); Dana Kabat-Farr 
& Lilia M. Cortina, Sex-Based Harassment in Employment: New Insights into Gender and Context, 38 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 58 (2014). 
74. On race and sexual harassment, see generally Tanya Katerí Hernández, “What Not to 
Wear”—Race and Unwelcomeness in Sexual Harassment Law: The Story of Meritor Savings Bank  
v. Vinson, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES 277 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman 
eds., 2011). 
75. See Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1439, 1440 (2009) (finding that multiple claims are less successful than single ones perhaps 
because judges conclude that multiple claims are less likely to be rooted in fact); Rachel Kahn Best, 
Lauren B. Edelman, Linda Hamilton Krieger & Scott R. Eliason, Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical 
Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 992 (2011) (demonstrating 
lower likelihood of success for intersectional plaintiffs); see also Rosalio Castro & Lucia Corral, 
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The most common type of harassment falls in the gender harassment category, 
followed by unwanted sexual attention, and finally, sexual coercion.76 Across many 
studies, sexual coercion has been found to be the least common type of behavior.77 
The vast majority of sexual harassment perpetrators are male, even when the accuser 
is male.78 People who are targeted or affected by sexual harassment often face 
repeated harassing behaviors.79 A majority of complaints involve coworker, rather 
than supervisory, harassment.80 But the stories that garner the most attention are 
those in which the CEO or someone equally powerful is the culprit—think Harvey 
Weinstein, Roger Ailes, Bill O’Reilly, and Matt Lauer, along with a host of state and 
federal legislators and other very public figures. A remarkable number of those 
outed after Weinstein held the highest positions in their respective companies.81 
Supervisory harassment is also more likely to result in a lawsuit.82 Sexism and sexual 
harassment are often interrelated,83 and #MeToo enabled some to make that 
 
Comment, Women of Color and Employment Discrimination: Race and Gender Combined in Title VII 
Claims, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 159 (1993); Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 
95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 727 (2015); Judy Trent Ellis, Sexual Harassment and Race: A Legal Analysis of 
Discrimination, 8 J. LEGIS. 30, 32, 41–42 (1981); Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, 
Work, and Title VII, 14 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 21 (1991). 
76. USMSPB 1995, supra note 66, at 16 tbl.4; SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT., SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT SURVEY 5–6 (1999) [hereinafter SHRM SURVEY ]. 
77. E.g., Kimberly T. Schneider, Suzanne Swan & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Job-Related and 
Psychological Effects of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from Two Organizations, 
82 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 401 (1997); Marina N. Rosenthal, Alec N. Smidt & Jennifer J. Freyd, Still Second 
Class: Sexual Harassment of Graduate Students, 40 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 364 (2016); Emily A. Leskinen, 
Lilia M. Cortina & Dana B. Kabat, Gender Harassment: Broadening Our Understanding of Sex-Based 
Harassment at Work, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 36 (2011); SHRM SURVEY, supra note 76, at 6 (seven 
percent); USMSPB 1995, supra note 66, at 16 tbl.4 (two percent); see also Ann Juliano & Stewart  
J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 565 (2001). 
78. USMSPB 1995, supra note 66, at 18; Magley et al., supra note 73. 
79. Rosenthal et al., supra note 77; Schneider et al., supra note 77. 
80. See SHRM SURVEY, supra note 76, at 5; USMSPB 1995, supra note 66, at 18; Kimberly  
T. Schneider, John B. Pryor & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment Research in the United States, in 
BULLYING AND HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 245, 247 (Ståle Einarsen, Helge Hoel, Dieter Zapf 
& Cary L. Cooper eds., 2d ed. 2011); Rosenthal et al., supra note 77. 
81. See Audrey Carlsen, Maya Salam, Claire Cain Miller, Denise Lu, Ash Ngu, Jugal K. Patel  
& Zach Wichter, #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Replacements  
Are Women., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-
replacements.html [https://perma.cc/RER2-EUJZ] (Oct. 29, 2018). 
82. A study of published sexual harassment cases found that a greater proportion of claims 
involved supervisory rather than coworker harassment. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 77, at 564. 
83. See, e.g., Margaret S. Stockdale, The Role of Sexual Misperceptions of Women’s Friendliness in 
an Emerging Theory of Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 84, 86 (1993) (explaining that 
those who score high on the “[l]ikelihood to [s]exually [h]arass” scale also demonstrate sexist beliefs); 
John B. Pryor, Sexual Harassment Proclivities in Men, 17 SEX ROLES 269, 277 (1987); Danielle Foulis 
& Marita P. McCabe, Sexual Harassment: Factors Affecting Attitudes and Perceptions, 37 SEX ROLES 
773, 776–77 (1997) (explaining that those holding sexist attitudes are less likely to define behavior as 
sexual harassment); Elizabeth O’Hare & William O’Donohue, Sexual Harassment: Identifying Risk 
Factors, 27 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 561, 576 (1998) (describing how the “existence of sexist 
attitudes in the workplace” is predictive of sexual harassment); see also Juliano & Schwab, supra note 77, 
at 578. 
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connection more clearly—and to note it as proof that the feminist movement had 
failed to restructure gender relations to ensure that women “were no longer seen as 
primarily sexual or reproductive objects.”84 
Even as the survey instruments have narrowed their scope to align more 
closely with legal definitions, respondents continue to report high rates of 
harassment. A 2016 report of an EEOC Task Force found that sixty percent of 
American women surveyed reported having experienced sex-based harassment.85 In 
any two-year period, four-in-ten women will experience at least one instance of 
harassment.86 These rates have held steady over several decades, and as much as we 
might like to think it will level off or decline eventually, millennials report higher 
rates of harassment than anyone else.87 
Information that has come to light as a result of the #MeToo movement 
confirms what we already knew: that sexual harassment continues to be a significant 
problem. For example, a 2018 PEW research poll found that 59% of women and 
27% of men say they have personally received unwanted sexual advances or verbal 
or physical harassment of a sexual nature, whether at work or elsewhere.88 Likewise, 
a Quinnipiac poll found that 69% of women had experienced sexual harassment at 
work.89 A poll by LeanIn.org found high rates of harassment among women in 
senior leadership or technical fields.90 
 
84. Eva Cox, #MeToo Is Not Enough: It Has Yet to Shift the Power Imbalances that Would Bring 
About Gender Equality, CONVERSATION (Mar. 18, 2018, 2:56 PM), https://theconversation.com/
metoo-is-not-enough-it-has-yet-to-shift-the-power-imbalances-that-would-bring-about-gender-equality 
-92108 [https://perma.cc/55G6-HFED]; see also Anastasia Powell & Elise Holland, Beyond #MeToo, 
We Need Bystander Action to Prevent Sexual Violence, CONVERSATION (Feb. 13, 2018, 2:07 PM), https:/
/theconversation.com/beyond-metoo-we-need-bystander-action-to-prevent-sexual-violence-91741 
[https://perma.cc/PJ5K-W6DB] (noting Australian survey data on the pervasiveness of sexism and 
discrimination that underlies harassment). 
85. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF 
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: REPORT OF CO-CHAIRS CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA  
A. LIPNIC 9 (2016) [hereinafter EEOC, SELECT TASK FORCE ], https://www. 
eeoc.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_files/eeoc/task_force/harassment/report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2JMF-S8Y7]. 
86. See id.; USMSPB 2018, supra note 66. 
87. See AMANDA ROSSIE, JASMINE TUCKER & KAYLA PATRICK, NAT’L WOMEN’S  
L. CTR., OUT OF THE SHADOWS: AN ANALYSIS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CHARGES FILED BY 
WORKING WOMEN 10 (2018). 
88. Nikki Graf, Sexual Harassment at Work in the Era of #MeToo, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 4, 
2018), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/04/04/sexual-harassment-at-work-in-the-era-of-MeToo/ 
[https://perma.cc/KMM7-5749 ]. 
89. 60% of U.S. Women Say They’ve Been Sexually Harassed Quinnipiac University National Poll 
Finds; Trump Job Approval Still Stuck Below 40%, QUINNIPIAC UNIV. POLL (Nov. 21, 2017), https://
poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2502 [https://perma.cc/2U8T-UUV7]. 
90. RACHEL THOMAS, LAREINA YEE, MARIANNE COOPER, ALEXIS KRIVKOVICH, ELLEN 
KONAR, IRINA STARIKOVA, MEGAN ROONEY, KELSEY ROBINSON, MARY NOBLE-TOLLA,  
MARIE-CLAUDE NADEAU, ALI BOHRER & NICOLE ROBINSON, LEAN IN, WOMEN IN  
THE WORKPLACE: 2018 (2018), https://wiw-report.s3.amazonaws.com/Women_in_the_Workplace 
_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/PRS7-8UJQ]. 
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While survey results suggest that the level of harassment has stagnated for 
more than thirty years, harassment-related lawsuits and administrative charges have 
risen dramatically during the same period. The number of administrative complaints 
filed with the EEOC continues to grow both in absolute numbers and as a 
percentage of the total complaints processed.91 Almost one-third of approximately 
90,000 charges received by the EEOC in 2015 included an allegation of workplace 
harassment.92 The number of charges with a sexual harassment component 
increased by twelve percent from 2017 to 2018.93 Internal reports of harassment 
have increased somewhat, although they still remain low compared to the rates of 
harassment reported in surveys. A 2019 report by Navex Global aggregates hotline 
and compliance reports from several thousand employers—and forty-four million 
employees—and provides benchmarks by which employers can compare their own 
experience with complaints. The report found that internal complaints of both 
harassment and discrimination increased by eighteen percent from 2016 to 2018.94 
All told, the data support the suggestion of the #MeToo movement that sexual 
misconduct remains a significant and intractable problem. 
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
A. In the Beginning 
Jane Corne and Geneva DeVane filed a lawsuit against their employer, Bausch 
+ Lomb, in the mid-1970s. They alleged that they had suffered discrimination at the 
hands of their supervisor, who drove them both to resign by subjecting them to 
relentless verbal and physical sexual advances.95 The federal judge who heard their 
case was openly skeptical about the theory that this type of conduct constituted 
 
91. Charges alleging sexual harassment filed with the EEOC rose from 6,696 in 2017 to 7,609 
in 2018. Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 2010 – FY 2020,  
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N [hereinafter EEOC CHARGE STATISTICS ], https://
www.eeoc.gov/statistics/charges-alleging-sex-based-harassment-charges-filed-eeoc-fy-2010-fy-2019 
[https://perma.cc/F2Z6-VSNC] ( last visited Mar. 30, 2021). Preliminary data shows that in 2018, the 
EEOC recovered nearly seventy million dollars for victims of sexual harassment through litigation and 
administrative enforcement, up from the $47.5 million collected in 2017. Press Release, U.S. Equal 
Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Releases Preliminary FY 2018 Sexual Harassment Data (Oct. 4, 
2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/10-4-18.cfm [https://perma.cc/6EX9-JVPK]. 
92. EEOC, SELECT TASK FORCE, supra note 85, at iv, 6. 
93. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, supra note 91. The number of sexual 
harassment charges decreased slightly in 2019. See Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity 
Comm’n, EEOC Releases Fiscal Year 2019 Enforcement and Litigation Data ( Jan. 24, 2020),  
https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-releases-fiscal-year-2019-enforcement-and-litigation-data 
[https://perma.cc/Q36T-8KYV]; see also Nigel Chiwaya, New Data on #MeToo’s First Year Shows 
‘Undeniable’ Impact, NBC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2018, 10:54 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/new-data-metoo-s-first-year-shows-undeniable-impact-n918821 [https://perma.cc/QVM2-72J2 ]. 
94. CARRIE PENMAN & RAINA HATHORNE, NAVEX GLOB., 2019 ETHICS & COMPLIANCE 
HOTLINE BENCHMARK REPORT 38–39 (2019) (“Our data indicates a growing inclination to speak up 
and a fundamental shift in employees’ willingness to tolerate harassment.”). 
95. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 
(9th Cir. 1977). 
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unlawful discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, 
among other things, prohibits employment actions based on a person’s sex.96 
Rejecting their claim, the judge observed that previous cases of sex discrimination 
“arose out of company policies” and involved “apparently some advantage to, or 
gain by, the employer from such discriminatory practices.”97 Here, in contrast, the 
supervisor’s “conduct appears to be nothing more than a personal proclivity, 
peculiarity or mannerism. . . . [He] was satisfying a personal urge.”98 Such an 
interpretation of the law would force employers to “have employees who were 
asexual” since that would be the “only sure way . . . [to] avoid such charges.”99 
The ruling in Corne v. Bausch & Lomb was followed a year later by a similarly 
dismissive one involving a supervisor’s sexual assault of a subordinate employee. 
Title VII, the judge wrote, was “not intended to provide a federal tort remedy for 
what amounts to physical attack motivated by sexual desire on the part of a 
supervisor and which happened to occur in a corporate corridor rather than a back 
alley.”100 These rulings were characteristic of an era in which sexual harassment had 
yet to achieve even the first step on the path toward a legal remedy. In a landmark 
article, Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat examined the complex social process that leads 
from an injury to a legal remedy. They identified three steps in the emergence of a 
legal dispute: naming (“saying to oneself that a particular experience has been 
injurious”); blaming (“when a person attributes an injury to the fault of another 
individual or social entity”); and claiming (“when someone with a grievance voices 
it to the person or entity believed to be responsible and asks for some remedy”).101 
Despite a slow start, working women and then federal courts did come to 
understand sexual harassment as a type of actionable discrimination. The catalyst 
was emerging social awareness about the pervasive problem of sexual imposition, 
followed by Catharine MacKinnon’s path-breaking 1979 book, The Sexual 
Harassment of Working Women, in which she put forth both a theoretical justification 
and a set of substantive legal principles for recognizing sexual harassment  
as discrimination.102 
In 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines that adopted MacKinnon’s framework 
wholesale. The guidelines defined actionable harassment as 
[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal 
or physical conduct of a sexual nature . . . when (1) submission to such 
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an 
 
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
97. Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 163–64. 
100. Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976), rev’d, 568 
F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). 
101. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation 
of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 635–36 (1980–1981). 
102. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A 
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 207–13 (1979). 
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individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct 
by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting 
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating 
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.103 
These guidelines were sandwiched between a 1979 Redbook magazine survey, 
which found unwelcome sexual comments and advances to be pervasive in the 
workplace, and the first survey of federal government employees in 1981, both of 
which suggested that sexual harassment was a common experience for women at 
work.104 By the time the Supreme Court first agreed to hear a sexual harassment 
case, there was a growing chorus of outrage over the treatment of women at work. 
Sexual harassment was the “quintessential feminist harm . . . . [T]he term was 
invented by feminist activists, given content by feminist litigators and scholars, and 
sustained by a wide-ranging body of scholarship generated largely by feminist 
academics.”105 Sexual harassment had its first moment in public consciousness 
when Anita Hill accused Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas of sexually 
harassing her while he served as chair of the agency charged with implementation 
of federal antidiscrimination laws.106 Although he was confirmed, the public airing 
of her claim catalyzed feminist advocacy, litigation, and a growing recognition by 
judges that sexual harassment impeded equal employment opportunity for women. 
B. Contemporary Standards 
In 1986, the Supreme Court heard its first sexual harassment case, Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson.107 The Court affirmed the growing consensus that quid pro 
quo harassment (the explicit conditioning of an employment consequence on sexual 
submission) and hostile environment harassment (the unwelcome conduct of a 
sexual nature that has the effect of creating a hostile, offensive, or abusive work 
environment) are actionable forms of intentional discrimination.108 And while the 
Court agreed that the plaintiff must prove that the harassment was “unwelcome,” 
it held that voluntariness and welcomeness were not the same thing.109 A plaintiff 
might tolerate incidents of harassment or submit to a boss’s sexual advances without 
welcoming them. A question raised but not fully resolved in Meritor was about the 
 
103. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) 
(1980). This section of the Guidelines was rescinded in 1999 and replaced with new guidelines reflecting 
new Supreme Court opinions on employer liability, as discussed below. 
104. Safran, supra note 30, at 217; USMSPB 1981, supra note 31, at 36. 
105. Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 37–38 (1993). 
106. See generally Anita F. Hill, Sexual Harassment: The Nature of the Beast, 65  
S. CAL. L. REV. 1445 (1992) (discussing her reaction to the response from her Senate Judiciary 
Committee testimony). 
107. 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
108. Id. at 65. 
109. Id. at 68. 
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proper standard for employer liability for workplace harassment.110 When is it 
reasonable to hold employers liable for conduct that it might or might not have the 
ability to control? The Meritor Court rejected both a rule of automatic liability and a 
rule of no liability—the anchors of a wide spectrum of lower-court rulings that 
preceded Meritor. But it did not settle on a clear rule. Rather, the Court directed 
lower courts to consider “agency principles” because Title VII defines “employer” 
to include “agents.”111 Courts disagreed about the right approach in the wake of 
Meritor. The employer liability questions would come to dominate sexual 
harassment litigation, but the Court meanwhile decided two additional cases on the 
standard for actionable harassment. In 1993, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the 
Court held that hostile environment harassment is actionable when a reasonable 
person in the victim’s shoes would perceive it as hostile or abusive, perhaps long 
before it causes severe psychological injury.112 Further, the Court held in Oncale  
v. Sundowner Offshore Services that same-sex harassment can be actionable as long as 
the plaintiff can prove the misconduct occurred “because of sex.”113 The Court also 
decided a set of cases interpreting Title VII’s ban on retaliation, some robustly 
protecting against it, some not.114 
In 1998, the Supreme Court revisited the question of employer liability that it 
had left open in Meritor. In two cases, the Court addressed the issues that had 
resulted in the most division among lower courts—the weight due an employer’s 
harassment policy in determining liability and the consequence for an employee’s 
failure to make use of an available grievance procedure. In Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Court set out a new framework 
for employer liability. For harassment by supervisors that results in a tangible 
employment action, employers are automatically liable because the harassing 
supervisor is typically “aided by the agency relation,” a standard basis for imputing 
liability from agent to master.115 But for supervisory harassment without a tangible 
consequence, employers may raise a two-prong affirmative defense in order to 
avoid liability or damages: 
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may 
raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The defense comprises two necessary 
 
110. See id. at 70. 
111. Id. at 72. 
112. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
113. 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998). 
114. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (interpreting broadly 
Title VII to protect against retaliatory actions, whether work-related or not, that “might have dissuaded 
a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination”); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t 
of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 279 n.3 (2009) (protecting witnesses and third-parties as 
well as victims against retaliation); Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2001) 
(undercutting protection by holding that only objectively reasonable complaints of discrimination 
trigger protection against retaliation). 
115. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742, 742 (1998). 
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elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid  
harm otherwise.116 
The definition of a supervisor took on new importance after these rulings, and 
the Court eventually decided another case, Vance v. Ball State University, in which it 
narrowed that definition to include only those with the power to “take tangible 
employment actions against the victim.”117 This standard excludes many who hold 
the power to dictate important aspects of an employee’s working conditions despite 
lacking the power to hire and fire. The Court in these cases also noted approvingly 
that employers can be held liable for harassment by coworkers or third parties if 
they knew or should have known of the behavior and failed to take prompt and 
effective remedial action.118 Employers may also be subject to “alter ego” liability 
when the harasser is so high in the company that his or her actions are fairly imputed 
to the company directly.119 
Perhaps this wasn’t obvious when the Supreme Court handed down its rulings 
in Faragher and Ellerth, but the affirmative defense sparked a clear shift from 
substance to procedure. Sexual harassment litigation revolves around whether 
employers have policies and procedures rather than whether they have been 
successful in their efforts to prevent or respond to problems of sexual misconduct. 
This shift was by design. Justice Kennedy wrote in Ellerth that the very purpose of 
Title VII is “to encourage the creation of anti-harassment policies and effective 
grievance mechanisms.”120 The Court cemented the focus on the existence of 
procedures the following year in Kolstad v. American Dental Association, in which the 
Court held that the availability of punitive damages turns on whether the employer 
made good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII, which can be proven with policies 
and procedures.121 
Against this evolving legal landscape, courts have been hearing sexual 
harassment cases for just over four decades. During that time, employers have 
dramatically changed their practices to better minimize liability for harassment. 
Where have these developments left us? 
 
116. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
117. 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013). 
118. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799 (noting that courts have “uniformly judg[ed] employer liability 
for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard”); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2020) (“With respect 
to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the 
workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known 
of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.”). 
119. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758. 
120. Id. at 764. 
121. 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999). 
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IV. LEGAL LIABILITY AND EFFORTS TO PREVENT AND CORRECT HARASSMENT 
The Supreme Court’s clarification of the standards of liability toward the end 
of the twentieth century kicked the liability-minimizing machine into high gear. At 
the same time, lower federal courts were considering the contours of the new 
liability regime. Much of the activity revolved around the meaning and application 
of the affirmative defense, which, in effect, imposes a requirement that employers 
adopt anti-harassment policies and procedures and that those who experience 
harassment complain promptly. An employer can avoid liability or damages only if 
both parties fail—the employer did not take reasonable care to prevent and correct 
sexually harassing behavior and the plaintiff “unreasonably failed to take advantage 
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.”122 Courts 
were quick to coalesce around the importance of policies and procedures and lost 
sight of the law’s purpose of promoting employment equality through the 
elimination of sexually harassing behaviors. This was unfortunate but 
understandable given Justice Kennedy’s remarkable declaration in Ellerth that the 
very purpose of Title VII is “to encourage the creation of anti-harassment policies 
and effective grievance mechanisms.”123 
In addition to a singular focus on policies and procedures rather than the actual 
problem of harassment, courts tended to make two additional moves that have 
undermined the law’s ability to tackle the problem of harassment. First, even though 
the two prongs of the affirmative defense are clearly stated in the conjunctive, some 
courts have collapsed the two prongs of the affirmative defense, contrary to the 
clear mandate of the Supreme Court, and instead hold that employers who satisfy 
just the first prong about their own efforts to prevent and correct harassment are 
off the hook.124 Second, when applying the second prong of the defense that 
focuses on victim response, courts took a harsh, unrealistic view of how quickly and 
assertively employees must complain about harassment and how many obstacles 
they must overcome to do so.125 These examples are just two of many pieces of 
evidence about the way in which substantive civil rights protections have been 
narrowed in the context of sexual misconduct. This is the case despite the fact that 
the Court has always spoken strongly about the harms of sexual harassment and the 
need for antidiscrimination law to protect against it. Forty years after the first 
articulation of sexual harassment as a wrong, the law remains insufficient to redress 
 
122. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
123. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
124. See, e.g., Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153, 164 (D. Md. 2000) (holding that 
an employer can avoid liability by proof of the first prong alone); Brown v. Henderson, 155  
F. Supp. 2d 502, 512 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (same). 
125. See, e.g., Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1292–93 (11th  
Cir. 2003) (finding a two-and-a-half-month delay in complaining unreasonable as a matter of law); 
Green v. Wills Grp., Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626 (D. Md. 2001) (finding it unreasonable that 
employee complained to wrong person by mistake); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 
(10th Cir. 2001) (refusing to excuse the failure to report harassment based on a fear of retaliation); see 
also Hébert, supra note 34, at 715–16. 
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it. Moreover, we have made little progress in our collective understanding of the 
ways in which sexual misconduct operates to the systematic disadvantage of women 
in the workplace. 
 
A. Incentives for Employers 
It doesn’t take long for legal rules to be translated into practical advice by 
lawyers, commentators, consultants, and human resource professionals. For sexual 
harassment, this process happened in a remarkably unified fashion. Employers 
coalesced quickly around a standard set of preventive and corrective measures in 
the wake of the Supreme Court’s rulings in Faragher and Ellerth. There is no 
individual liability under Title VII, so the incentives to minimize liability fall  
to employers.126 
Employers have an incentive to prevent quid pro quo harassment because 
such behavior, if proven, results in automatic liability.127 The best prevention 
mechanisms for employers include better screening and hiring practices, more 
effective training, and better monitoring during employment. The power employers 
have to undertake these activities was part of why the Supreme Court decided on a 
rule of automatic liability.128 This type of misconduct represents only a small 
percentage of litigated cases not only because it is less common but also because it 
is more severe and thus likely to be settled quietly rather than through contentious 
litigation. The bulk of employers’ efforts to minimize liability are responding to the 
affirmative defense’s call that they be able to prove they undertook reasonable 
measures to prevent harassment and reasonable measures to correct harassment 
once it occurred. These incentives are sometimes reinforced by employers’ 
insurance policies that condition coverage on certain preventative and  
corrective measures.129 
An employer’s duty to prevent harassment can be satisfied through the 
adoption of formal anti-harassment policies, the provision of anti-harassment 
training, and the use of other concrete measures such as anonymous reporting 
systems or use of an ombudsperson. The Supreme Court stopped short of requiring 
formal policies, but wrote in Faragher that 
[w]hile proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy 
with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of 
law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances 
 
126. See, e.g., Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 
F.3d 1295, 1313–17 (2d Cir. 1995); Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995). 
127. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790. 
128. See id. at 803. 
129. See, e.g., John D. Canoni, Sexual Harassment: The New Liability, 46 RISK MGMT. 12, 16 
(1999) (“EPLI will become more popular—even applying for such insurance is helpful because carriers 
will not cover a company unless its employment policies and procedures are in order.”). 
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may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element 
of the defense.130 
Courts have been strict with employers who do not have policies but flexible 
as to the type of policy that might be deemed sufficiently preventative. Policies 
should describe prohibited conduct, identify individuals to whom complaints 
should be brought, provide a bypass procedure to ensure no victim will have to 
complain to the harasser, and offer a user-friendly grievance procedure.131 A clause 
that specifically prohibits retaliation will provide further support for an employer’s 
claim of reasonable prevention.132 Policies must also be sufficiently disseminated.133 
As one appellate court applied the standard, distribution of an adequate policy 
provides “compelling proof” of adequate prevention, which can only be rebutted 
with evidence that the “employer adopted or administered [it] in bad faith or that 
the policy was otherwise defective or dysfunctional.”134 Other courts have applied 
the standard in a more rigorous way by also evaluating whether the disseminated 
policies are “reasonably designed and reasonably effectual.”135 
Courts often suggest that employers take additional preventative measures 
such as anti-harassment training, although they rarely find the presence or absence 
of training dispositive on the question of liability.136 As part of a general preventative 
effort, the existence of training weighs in the employer’s favor;137 the lack of training 
 
130. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The EEOC has taken the position that small businesses may be 
able to satisfy this prong of the affirmative defense without a formal, written policy as long as they have 
informal mechanisms in place for preventing harassment. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY  
COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-1999-2, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY  
FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS § V.C (1999) [hereinafter EEOC  
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ]. 
131. See, e.g., Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2000); Madray v. Publix 
Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1297–99 (11th Cir. 2000); Gentry v. Exp. Packaging Co., 238 F.3d 
842, 847–48 (7th Cir. 2001); O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 736 (1st Cir. 2001); Kohler 
v. Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F.3d 1167, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001); Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 
F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001). 
132. See, e.g., Thomas v. BET Soundstage Rest., 104 F. Supp. 2d 558, 565 (D. Md. 2000). 
133. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. 
134. Barrett, 240 F.3d at 266; see also Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 811–12 (7th  
Cir. 1999). 
135. Reese v. Meritor Auto., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827 (W.D.N.C. 2000), aff’d, 246  
F.3d 667 (2001); see also Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1268  
(M.D. Ala. 2001); Reed v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1068  
(M.D. Tenn. 2000). 
136. See, e.g., Peter Aronson, Justices’ Sex Harassment Decisions Spark Fears: Companies Review 
Policies to Avoid ‘Ellerth’ Liability, 21 NAT’L L.J. 1,1 (1998); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with 
Sledgehammers: The Questionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal 
Profession, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147, 156–61 (2001); Shaw, 180 F.3d at 812–13; Harrison 
v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1028 (10th Cir. 2001); Matvia v. Bald Head Island  
Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 510  
(6th Cir. 2001). 
137. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Dart Container Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d 760, 764 (S.D. Miss. 2008); 
McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 275 F. Supp. 2d 982, 992 (E.D. Ark. 2003), aff’d, 375 F.3d 762 (8th  
Cir. 2004); Maddin v. GTE of Fla., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1032 (M.D. Fla. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca 
Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 877 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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weighs against it.138 Some states require employers to offer training, at least in some 
circumstances.139 Employers also sometimes take additional steps to prevent 
harassment (or nip it in the bud), such as monitoring employee email for offensive 
language or images, providing remedial training for individuals, instituting 
anonymous hotlines, and so on. The legal relevance of these measures is unclear.140 
A conundrum in the world of harassment prevention is that employers get clear 
credit for setting up a complaint procedure but effectively penalized under the 
second prong of the affirmative defense if an employee who experiences 
harassment makes use of it. Employers thus have an incentive to devise a system 
that appears to elicit complaints but actually suppresses them. 
The affirmative defense also provides employers with an incentive to respond 
to complaints of harassment, as well as to known incidents even if not the subject 
of a complaint. Although the rules of liability are different, employers can also be 
held liable for harassment of their employees by supervisors, coworkers, or third 
parties.141 The negligence standard gives employers an incentive to intervene in 
cases where they know or suspect harassment has occurred. 
Reasonable care to correct harassment is based on two employer  
actions: maintaining an appropriate grievance procedure (overlapping with the rules 
on prevention) and responding appropriately to actual complaints.142 The grievance 
procedure should be constructed in a manner to elicit complaints (subject to the 
perverse incentive discussed above to suppress complaints simultaneously). Courts 
have given their imprimatur to varied complaint procedures and given employers 
tremendous discretion to determine what manner of complaint is necessary to 
trigger a formal investigation.143 Beyond simply maintaining a complaint procedure, 
employers must also adequately respond to known incidents of harassment, whether 
they learn of it through a formal complaint or other means.144 The response should 
 
138. See, e.g., U.S. EEOC v. Dave’s Supermarkets, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19881, at *47 
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2011); Hollis v. City of Buffalo, 28 F. Supp. 2d 812, 821 (W.D.N.Y. 1998); Gordon 
v. S. Bells, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 966, 983 (S.D. Ind. 1999). 
139. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.1(a) (2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-54 (2021); 775  
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 2-105(B)(5)(c) (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h (2021). The EEOC implores 
employers to offer general anti-harassment training to all employees, as well as targeted training to 
supervisory employees. See Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Launches 
New Training Program on Respectful Workplaces (Oct. 4, 2017) [hereinafter EEOC Press  
Release, Respectful Workplaces ], https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/10-4-17.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/M8QA-BXSL]. 
140. See David Sherwyn, Michael Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel 
Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the 
Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1300–01 (2001). 
141. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998); see also 29  
C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2020). 
142. See Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2000); Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand 
USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1269 n.22 (M.D. Ala. 2001); Thomas v. BET Soundstage Rest., 104 
F. Supp. 2d 558, 565 (D. Md. 2000). 
143. See, e.g., Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1297–99 (11th Cir. 2000). 
144. See, e.g., EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 510 (6th Cir. 2001). 
Second to Printer_Grossman.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/4/21  1:13 PM 
970 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:943 
ordinarily include an investigation and, if harassment is found, responsive measures 
reasonably calculated to stop the harassment.145 Thus, a court found the employer 
could be held liable when a corporate officer responded to one victim’s formal 
complaint by telling her “that things had been that way for a long time at [this 
company], that the business world was full of pricks like Charlie . . . and . . . to get 
used to it because that is the way the business world was.”146 An employer can 
successfully avoid liability if its measures are successful in stopping  
the harassment.147 
Employers learned quickly after Faragher and Ellerth about their newly 
clarified obligations. Information came from a variety of sources, one of which was 
EEOC guidelines published the following year in 1999.148 But much of the 
knowledge was transmitted through intermediaries like consultants and professional 
associations. Like much advice for employers, this was styled generally as “recipes 
for legal compliance.” In other words, the advice spelled out the steps necessary to 
avoid lawsuits rather than how to eliminate the underlying problem.149 The response 
by employers was nothing short of rapid. Some employers already had policies and 
procedures that might have dealt with discrimination, courtesy of a movement that 
began in the late 1960s after the enactment of Title VII and the surrounding 
uncertainty about employers’ responsibilities in the discrimination context.150 But 
policies dealing with harassment didn’t appear until after the Supreme Court’s 1986 
decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, which made clear that liability turned at 
least in part on employer behavior.151 But within a year after the Faragher and Ellerth 
decisions, ninety-seven percent of employers in one survey had written policies 
prohibiting sexual harassment.152 Most of these policies included the legally required 
elements and were disseminated in standard ways. Many employers took additional 
measures as well, including offering or mandating anti-harassment training. More 
than half of employers provide sexual harassment prevention training; larger 
organizations are especially likely to do so.153 Employers formalized their corrective 
measures, with; the vast majority of employers instituted formal investigatory 
processes for sexual harassment.154 Many also instituted mediation or arbitration to 
resolve harassment complaints without resort to litigation. 
 
145. See, e.g., Beard v. S. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 799 (8th Cir. 2001); Ogden v. Wax Works, 
Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000); Kohler v. Inter-Tel Tech., 244 F.3d 1167, 1181 (9th Cir. 2001). 
146. Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1208–09 (10th Cir. 2000). 
147. See Swingle v. Henderson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 625, 637 (D.N.J. 2001), aff’d, 35 F. App’x 39 
(3d Cir. 2002); Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 932–34 (7th Cir. 1999). 
148. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 130. 
149. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment 
Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 980–81 (1999); see also James J. Oh, Internal 
Sexual Harassment Complaints: Investigating to Win, 18 EMP. RELS. L.J. 227, 227 (1992). 
150. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 149, at 968. 
151. See 477 U.S. 57, 71–73 (1986). 
152. See SHRM SURVEY, supra note 76, at 6. 
153. See id. at 8. 
154. See id. 
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B. Responses to Harassment 
The rules of employer liability create incentives for those who experience 
sexual harassment as well. The second prong of the affirmative defense, which 
requires the employer to prove that “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to 
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise,” is the main source of an incentive to 
promptly complain.155 By complaining promptly and through correct channels, the 
victim of harassment can prevent the employer from satisfying the affirmative 
defense.156 Although it is entirely unclear how most harassment victims would learn 
about the affirmative defense or other standards for employer liability, courts treat 
victims as if, like employers, they should be expected to respond appropriately to 
legal incentives. As discussed above, courts have strictly enforced the victim’s duty 
to complain.157 Courts also expect victims to comply with the procedures for 
internal dispute resolution set out by the employer, as long as the policy containing 
the procedures was made available to employees.158 Victims are also expected to 
cooperate with the employer’s investigation, despite fears of retaliation or concerns 
about confidentiality.159 Victims are not permitted the luxury of either waiting to 
see whether a problem escalates, nor taking the time to evaluate whether the 
benefits of complaining outweigh the likely costs.160 Courts discourage watching 
and waiting even though retaliation is a very likely result of a complaint and a 
successful resolution is unlikely.161 
Unlike employers, who tend to behave precisely in the ways the law predicts, 
employees who experience harassment deviate substantially from expectations for 
a “typical” victim. In reality, people who experience harassment primarily respond 
in ways that are informal, internal, and nonconfrontational.162 Filing a complaint 
with an employer is the least likely course of action.163 According to a 
 
155. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
156. See infra text accompanying notes 245–250. 
157. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How the New Economics Can Improve Employment 
Discrimination Law, and How Economics Can Survive the Demise of the “Rational Actor,” 51  
WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 239 (2009) (“[M]ost courts interpret Faragher and Ellerth as imposing an 
employee duty to complain internally about harassment, to do so promptly, and to do so in all cases 
lacking a highly specific threat of retaliation.”). 
158. See, e.g., Mernik v. Classic Cars, Inc., No. 3:99-CV-1327-P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9373, at 
*34–35 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2000), aff’d, 273 F.3d 1095 (5th Cir. 2011). 
159. See, e.g., Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 2000); Marsicano  
v. Am. Soc’y of Safety Eng’rs, No. 97-C7819, 1998 WL 603128, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1998); Matvia 
v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 269–70 (4th Cir. 2001). 
160. See Matvia, 259 F.3d at 269. 
161. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001). But see Reed v. Cracker 
Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1069 (M.D. Tenn. 2000); Young v. R.R. Morrison 
& Son, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Miss. 2000). 
162. See, e.g., Fitzgerald et al., supra note 35.Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories 
in Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 136–41 (2001). 
163. See, e.g., David E. Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, The Identification and Classification of 
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comprehensive study of federal employees, forty-four percent of those who had 
experienced sexual harassment took no action in response, while only twelve 
percent reported the conduct to a supervisor or other official.164 “The single most 
common response of employees who are targets of sexual harassing behaviors 
hasn’t changed . . . since 1980. That response has been, and continues to be, to 
ignore the behavior or do nothing.”165 Our unrealistic expectations for victims are 
exacerbated by the fact that studies show hypothetical victims respond much more 
assertively and formally than actual victims.166 In the real world, seeking 
“institutional/organizational relief” is a last resort.167 
1. Evaluating the Effectiveness of Typical Measures 
If the legal system worked well, it would operate to prevent harassment and 
compensate victims, the twin goals of Title VII. Or it would at least bring us 
substantially closer to those goals. As we saw in the previous section, employees 
who experience harassment are often underprotected because they respond to 
harassment in ways different than we expect, making it difficult to prevail under the 
existing rules of liability. But the regime masks another equally serious error. It 
permits employers to avoid liability or damages for taking measures to prevent or 
correct harassment regardless of whether they are likely to work. The law rewards 
cosmetic compliance over success in preventing or remediating the underlying 
problem of harassment. 
Human resource professionals often claim that “their biggest problem with 
the issue of sexual harassment is that the majority of employees are uncertain as to 
what constitutes sexual harassment.”168 The implication is that differences in 
perception may be neutralized by clear policies or training about the boundaries 
between acceptable and unacceptable conduct.169 But studies on the causes of 
harassment do not support a large role for so-called boundary differentiation as an 
 
Responses to Sexual Harassment, 10 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1 (1989); see also Barbara A. Gutek  
& Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed Organizations: Consequences of and Coping with Sexual 
Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 28, 37 (1993) (reviewing studies). 
164. See, e.g., USMSPB 1995, supra note 66, at 29–30. All available studies confirm low rates of 
reporting. See, e.g., Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sandra L. Shullman, Nancy Bailey, Margaret Richards, Janice 
Swecker, Yael Gold, Mimi Ormerod & Lauren Weitzman, The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual 
Harassment in Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152, 162 (1988). 
165. See, e.g., USMSPB 1995, supra note 66, at 29. 
166. Gutek & Koss, supra note 163, at 37 (reviewing surveys and studies). 
167. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 35, at 120. 
168. Gerald L. Blakely, Eleanor H. Blakely & Robert H. Moorman, The Effects of Training on 
Perceptions of Sexual Harassment Allegations, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 71, 72 (1998) (citing J.J. Laabs, 
HR Puts Its Sexual Harassment Questions on the Line, 74 PERS. J. 36 (1995)). 
169. Douglas D. Baker, David E. Terpstra & Bob D. Cutler, Perceptions of Sexual  
Harassment: A Re-Examination of Gender Differences, 124 J. PSYCH. 409, 410, 415 (1990); Douglas  
D. Baker, David E. Terpstra & Kinley Larntz, The Influence of Individual Characteristics and Severity of 
Harassing Behavior on Reactions to Sexual Harassment, 22 SEX ROLES 305, 320 (1990); William  
H. Hendrix, Justin D. Rueb & Robert P. Steel, Sexual Harassment and Gender Differences, 13  
J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 235, 248 (1998). 
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explanation.170 Employers and employees alike often perceive that anti-harassment 
policies are effective at reducing the amount of misconduct, but the stagnant level 
of harassment in the wake of widespread adoption of policies tells a different 
story.171 Empirical studies show a cognizable but limited role for policies and 
information campaigns in reducing harassment, particularly less severe forms.172 
However, studies found that these methods are not as effective in targeting more 
severe forms of harassment, especially if the behavior is directed at a specific 
person. For misconduct of that nature, more proactive methods that convey a true 
commitment by the employer to actively control the work environment are 
necessary. The research is summed up fairly by the conclusion of one researcher 
that “sexual harassment is curtailed only when an organization makes a 
concerted . . . and highly visible effort to deal with the problem.”173 
Anti-harassment training, which the law encourages but does not require, 
holds more promise than policies and procedures. In theory, training programs are 
designed to increase awareness of sexual harassment and, in turn, to change both 
attitudes and behavior.174 Based on an assumption that this is an effective approach, 
former EEOC chair Eleanor Holmes Norton claimed that “[s]exual harassment has 
developed as one of the great lessons in how education can have an effect on an 
offensive practice.”175 The EEOC continues to recommend that employers use 
“periodic training” to “ensure that its supervisors and managers understand their 
responsibilities under the organization’s anti-harassment policy and complaint 
procedure.”176 This training, the EEOC recommends, “should explain the types of 
conduct that violate the employer’s anti-harassment policy; the seriousness of the 
policy; the responsibilities of supervisors and managers when they learn of alleged 
harassment; and the prohibition against retaliation.”177 In 2018, the EEOC launched 
 
170. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The Reasonable Woman Standard: A Meta-Analytic Review 
of Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 33, 35–37 (1998); 
Antonia Abbey, Misperceptions of Friendly Behavior as Sexual Interest: A Survey of Naturally Occurring 
Incidents, 11 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 173 (1987); Catherine B. Johnson, Margaret S. Stockdale & Frank  
E. Saal, Persistence of Men’s Misperceptions of Friendly Cues Across a Variety of Interpersonal Encounters, 
15 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 463 (1991); Frank E. Saal, Catherine B. Johnson & Nancy Weber, Friendly or 
Sexy? It May Depend on Whom You Ask, 13 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 263 (1989). 
171. USMSPB 1995, supra note 66, at 40–41 (noting that respondents deemed a policy among 
the “most effective an organization could take,” while also reporting that policies did not seem to 
change behavior of employees). 
172. James E. Gruber, The Impact of Male Work Environments and Organizational Policies on 
Women’s Experiences of Sexual Harassment, 12 GENDER & SOC’Y 301, 316 (1998). 
173. See id.; John B. Pryor, Christine M. LaVite & Lynette M. Stoller, A Social Psychological 
Analysis of Sexual Harassment: The Person/Situation Interaction, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 68 (1993). 
174. Blakely et al., supra note 168, at 80. 
175. Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, 13 WORKING WOMAN 69,  
73 (1988). 
176. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 130, § V.C.2. 
177. Id. 
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a new training program to foster “respectful workplaces.”178 Survey respondents 
share the EEOC’s optimism about the effectiveness of training.179 
While most courts tend to view anti-harassment training as relevant to the 
question of employer liability, there is much more variation in the way they value it 
than there is with policies and procedures. Unlike anti-harassment policies and 
internal grievance procedures, training in most circumstances is not considered a 
mandatory measure.180 In cases brought under Title VII, no employer has ever failed 
to succeed on the affirmative defense or failed to refute an allegation of negligence 
solely because it failed to offer anti-harassment training.181 A few courts have faulted 
companies for failing to offer training pursuant to their own policies that mandated 
it,182 but courts in only a single jurisdiction, interpreting state rather than federal 
law, have held training to be an essential component of liability avoidance.183 
 
178. EEOC Press Release, Respectful Workplaces, supra note 139. 
179. USMSPB 1995, supra note 66, at 43. 
180. Several states, however, require at least certain employers to offer training. See,  
e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.1(a) (2021) (requiring employers with fifty or more employees to 
provide “at least two hours of classroom or other effective interactive training and education regarding 
sexual harassment to all supervisory employees” and to repeat training every two years);  
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-54(15) (2021) (requiring employers with more than three employees to 
provide sexual harassment training to supervisory personnel); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 2-105(B)(5)(c) 
(2020) (requiring, among other things, that state agencies provide sexual harassment training to all 
employees); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 807 (2021) (requiring workplaces with fifteen or more 
employees to conduct anti-harassment training for all employees covering basic information about 
harassment law and internal grievance procedures and to offer additional training for supervisory 
employees that focuses on their unique responsibilities to address problems of harassment);  
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h (2021) (requiring all employers to adopt a policy against sexual 
harassment and encouraging them to offer sexual harassment training to all employees). 
181. See, e.g., Dugger v. Or. Rest. Servs., Inc., No. CV. 05-547-PK, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17893, at *18–19 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 2006) (finding employer’s preventive efforts reasonable despite the 
lack of periodic harassment training); Wahlstrom v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 89 F. Supp. 2d 
506, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that “Title VII does not require employers to provide  
[anti-harassment] training to every employee” and finding that employer took adequate preventative 
measures even though only managers received training); Caldwell v. Leavitt, 378 F. Supp. 2d 639, 664 
(M.D.N.C. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 289 Fed. App’x 579 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that employer 
undertook reasonable preventative efforts even though no formal training was offered); cf. Matvia  
v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that employer’s prevention 
efforts were not inadequate solely because employees could not recall the details); Hernandez-Payero 
v. Pereira, 493 F. Supp. 2d 215 (D.P.R. 2007) (reversing summary judgment for employer because there 
were genuine issues of fact about the adequacy of its remedial measures; the fact that training was 
voluntary, rather than mandatory, and that one alleged harasser did not receive training were among the 
many issues raised by plaintiff to defeat employer’s defense). 
182. See EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 510, 514 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that a 
jury might reasonably infer the company’s anti-harassment policy was “in name only” given the failure 
to provide training mandated by the company’s official procedures); see also Mancuso v. City of Atlantic 
City, 193 F. Supp. 2d 789, 804 (D.N.J. 2002). 
183. See Gaines v. Bellino, 801 A.2d 322, 330 (N.J. 2002) (noting, under New Jersey’s Law 
Against Discrimination, that for an employer to earn a “safe haven from vicarious liability,” it must, 
among other things, offer “training for workers, supervisors, and managers concerning how to 
recognize and eradicate unlawful harassment;” training must be mandatory for supervisors and offered 
to all other employees); Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli’s Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 822 A.2d 647, 654–55  
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding employer liable for harassment where it failed to have a formal 
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The variation among courts comes both in the way they conceptualize the 
purpose of anti-harassment training and the weight they give it. With respect to 
purpose, courts might consider training as a means of preventing harassment, as a 
corrective measure for harassment, or as an inducement to victims to complain 
about harassment. They might also use training as evidence of the employer’s 
subjective intent to maintain a workplace free of harassment or view training as a 
serious effort to reduce retaliation against victims who complain. The particular 
purpose for which the training is valued will dictate who is supposed to have 
attended—the supervisor who should have been monitoring the situation, the 
perpetrator who would have been deterred before engaging in harassing behavior 
or successfully re-educated afterward, the victim who should have known how to 
file an internal complaint, or the manager designated to receive or handle 
complaints who should have known how to respond to an internal grievance once 
filed. Within each possible purpose, courts also vary in the significance they accord 
anti-harassment training. And, in many, many cases, training is simply included in 
the recitation of facts or listed among a litany of actions the court seems to take into 
account when reaching general conclusions about the reasonableness or sufficiency 
of employers’ actions when dealing with past or prospective harassment. 
Policymakers urge training, employees are optimistic about its usefulness, and 
the law values it, even if unevenly. The research is more agnostic on the usefulness 
of training. There is relatively little data on the prevalence of training.184 There is 
even less on its effectiveness.185 Unfortunately, sexual harassment training programs 
often lack well-articulated theoretical or empirical foundations, which makes 
evaluation a challenge.186 Varying along many dimensions (e.g., length, formality, 
amount of integration with other training and/or employees’ normal work routine), 
such programs lack consistent rationales, goals, or procedures, and little research 
exists to guide their development or to assess their effectiveness. 
Few studies exist that empirically evaluate programs designed to prevent 
sexual harassment. Those that do tend to find a positive but limited benefit. There 
 
policy against it and failed to provide any training on the issue), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 853 A.2d 921 
(N.J. 2004); cf. Stevenson v. Precision Standard, Inc., 762 So. 2d 820, 823 (Ala. 1999) (noting testimony 
of plaintiff’s expert that sexual harassment was inadequate because it was not mandatory, conducted 
only once, and attended only by supervisors). A handful of federal cases have suggested that training is 
an essential component of an “effective” policy, but no court has decided a case in which that standard 
was applied to preclude the employer from prevailing on the affirmative defense. See, e.g., Clark  
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 400 F.3d 341, 349–50 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that “an effective policy should 
at least . . . provide for training regarding the policy”). 
184. A notable exception is Elizabeth C. Tippett, Harassment Trainings: A Content Analysis, 39 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 481 (2018). 
185. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 136, at 164 (“There is, in light of currently available research, 
absolutely no scientific basis for concluding that harassment training fosters employee tolerance and 
greatly alters workplace culture.”). 
186. See Elizabeth O’Hare Grundmann, William O’Donohue & Scott H. Peterson, The 
Prevention of Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 
175, 175–76 (William O’Donohue ed., 1997). 
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is more evidence that training affects the knowledge of participants rather than their 
attitudes or behavior.187 The existing studies are perhaps more notable for their 
limits than their findings. Many involve questionable or nonexistent comparison 
groups or rely on small samples composed entirely of students. One well-designed 
study found that while training increased knowledge, it also made participants 
evaluate the effectiveness of the employer’s grievance procedures less favorably, 
perhaps because some learned what they could do as much as what they could not 
do.188 This study also found that individual attitudes and perceptions of the 
organization’s tolerance of harassment were quite resistant to change.189 More 
research is desperately needed to support the frequent call from experts for more 
sexual harassment awareness training. 
As flawed as many of the preventative efforts are, the corrective measures are 
often worse. The law has the broad effect of internalizing dispute resolution and 
leaving control over the process to employers. One major flaw is that the entire 
system is predicated on the assumption that employers learn of harassment after 
victims complain. But, as discussed above, victims rarely file formal complaints. 
Research suggests that not only are victims unlikely to learn about the rules that 
place such a premium on filing an internal complaint, but also that even if they 
know of them, they will be unlikely to conform their behavior. Victims cite two 
primary reasons for foregoing formal complaint mechanisms. First, they fear 
retaliation and the potential consequences for economic security.190 Second, they 
tend to believe a complaint will be futile, leaving them no better off and perhaps 
worse.191 More research is needed about the conditions that might encourage more 
reporting.192 Women of color are even less likely to report harassment because they 
are more likely to suffer economic vulnerability, to lack mobility in the workforce, 
to be disbelieved, to lack social support, and to distrust internal complaint 
 
187. See, e.g., Sandra J. Maurizio & Janet L. Rogers, Sexual Harassment and Attitudes in Rural 
Community Care Workers, 16 HEALTH VALUES 40, 41 (1992) (finding that participants who completed 
training were more likely to correctly define sexual harassment, understand its legal ramifications, 
evaluate it as more of a problem at work than they previously thought, and report fewer  
victim-blaming attitudes). 
188. Vicki J. Magley, Louise F. Fitzgerald, Jan Salisbury, Fritz Drasgow & Michael J. Zickar, 
Changing Sexual Harassment Within Organizations via Training Interventions: Suggestions and Empirical 
Data, in THE FULFILLING WORKPLACE: THE ORGANIZATION’S ROLE IN ACHIEVING INDIVIDUAL 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL HEALTH (Ronald J. Burke & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2013). 
189. See id. 
190. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 35, at 122–23; see also Denise H. Lach & Patricia  
A. Gwartney-Gibbs, Sociological Perspectives on Sexual Harassment and Workplace Dispute Resolution, 
42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 102, 110–11 (1993). The law significantly underappreciates the role 
retaliation plays in shaping victim behavior. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by 
Starting with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49 (2018). 
191. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 35, at 127. 
192. See Linda Brooks & Annette R. Perot, Reporting Sexual Harassment: Exploring a Predictive 
Model, 15 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 31, 33 (1991). 
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procedures.193 Moreover, racialized sexual stereotypes can make it difficult for 
women of color to convince a factfinder that sexual behavior is unwelcome—or 
that it is severe or pervasive enough to cause harm.194 As Maria Ontiveros observed, 
for example, “Latinas are often perceived as readily available and accessible for 
sexual use, with few recriminations to be faced for abusing them.”195 Black women 
have been central to the development of sexual harassment law—the plaintiff in the 
first sexual harassment case to reach the Supreme Court was a black woman—and 
yet are marginalized by activists and less likely to benefit from the movement’s 
successes.196 Class status also intersects with sexual harassment to disadvantage 
lower-income women and those who work in traditionally  
male-dominated jobs. As Angela Onuachi-Willig observes, “courts have reified 
class bias, inequities, and stereotyped perceptions of blue-collar workers in sexual 
harassment law by insisting that the bar for proving sexual harassment is higher in 
blue-collar work environments because crass and crude language are common in 
such environments.”197 
Suffice it to say that the near-universal adoption of anti-harassment policies 
and procedures has done little to alter the forces that keep most victims from 
complaining about harassment. Moreover, the rules of liability do not give 
employers the incentive to undertake efforts that might make complaining less 
fraught, such as eliminating gender imbalance in the workplace and maintaining 
tight control over the work environment. As explained above, the sweet spot for 
employers is a system that appears to elicit complaints while quietly  
squelching them. 
When complaints do reach the employer, we see many potential flaws. Internal 
investigations are the centerpiece of the remedial approach endorsed by the 
Supreme Court, but there is no oversight of the investigations actually performed. 
Employers must conduct an investigation, but there is no real means to differentiate 
a masterful one from a botched one. One federal appellate court went so far as to 
 
193. See Hernández, supra note 74, at 295; see also Katherine Giscombe, Sexual Harassment and 
Women of Color, CATALYST (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.catalyst.org/2018/02/13/sexual-
harassment-and-women-of-color [https://perma.cc/976K-XD5H] (noting lower penalties for and 
lower prosecution rates of those who assault women of color). 
194. See Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model 
Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 185, 190–94 (1997). 
195. Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassment of Women of Color, 23 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 817, 820 (1993). 
196. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, What About #UsToo?: The Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo 
Movement, 128 YALE L.J.F. 105, 107 (2018); see also DeNeen L. Brown, She Said Her Boss Raped Her in 
a Bank Vault. Her Sexual Harassment Case Would Make Legal History., WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2017, 
8:17 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/10/13/she-said-her-boss-
raped-her-in-a-bank-vault-her-sexual-harassment-case-would-make-legal-history [https://perma.cc/ 
ZT9B-4D2R]; GILLIAN THOMAS, BECAUSE OF SEX: ONE LAW, TEN CASES, AND FIFTY YEARS THAT 
CHANGED AMERICAN WOMEN’S LIVES AT WORK 81–105 (2016). 
197. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 196, at 110. 
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declare that it already has “enough to do” and that its job “does not include 
micromanaging internal investigations.”198 
Internal investigations are plagued by some common pitfalls that undermine 
their fairness (actual and perceived) and effectiveness.199 Investigations tend to fall 
short on measures of procedural justice (how the decision is made), interactional 
justice (how people are treated during the process), and distributive justice (whether 
the result is fair).200 A flawed investigation is not only a problem for the incident at 
issue, but it also deters future complaints. The challenge of maintaining 
confidentiality is significant, and victims often cite this as a reason for foregoing an 
internal grievance procedure.201 Second, all parties tend to view the investigation as 
biased.202 Bias is likely unavoidable and undermines the ability of any procedure to 
deliver justice. The most significant problem is that the person handling the internal 
complaint, often a human resources employee, will have to transition from a 
purportedly neutral factfinder during the internal process to a fact witness for the 
employer in any eventual lawsuit.203 This colors that person’s perspective from the 
outset. It should come as no surprise that in-house factfinders tend to be biased in 
favor of the institution, nor that they harbor their own explicit and implicit biases.204 
A lawsuit against Microsoft revealed that female employees had filed 118 
complaints of gender discrimination between 2010 and 2016, and the internal 
investigation unit, part of what Microsoft describes as a “fair and robust system,” 
concluded that only one was founded.205 Investigators may also have their own 
predispositions about sexual harassment that affect their the way they collect and 
evaluate evidence.206 Gender, for example, may play a role, as men tend to take 
sexual harassment less seriously than women.207 The bias can be hard to spot or 
 
198. See Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 480 F.3d 1287, 1304 (11th Cir. 2007). 
199. See Peter W. Dorfman, Anthony T. Cobb & Roxanne Cox, Investigations of Sexual 
Harassment Allegations: Legal Means Fair—or Does It?, 39 HUM. RES. MGMT. 33 (2000) (outlining best 
practices for harassment investigations). 
200. See id. at 34 (describing three basic measures of justice used in fields of management and 
organizational theory). 
201. See Edward J. Costello Jr., The Mediation Alternative in Sex Harassment Cases,  
ARB. J., Mar. 1992, at 16, 17–18. 
202. See id. at 18; Jonathan Day, The Problem of Perceptions: Reasons for Outsourcing the Sexual 
Harassment Investigation, 27 EMP. RELS. TODAY, Spring 2000, at 101, 103. 
203. Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger & John Lande, Internal Dispute Resolution: The 
Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 506 (1993). 
204. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 
1587 (1991). 
205. Rachel Lerman, 118 Gender-Bias Complaints at Microsoft, but Firm Found Only 1 Was 
‘Founded,’ Lawsuit Says, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018, 11:03 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/
business/microsoft/female-microsoft-workers-file-118-gender-bias-complaints-in-7-years-but-firm-
finds-only-1-was-founded/ [https://perma.cc/246Y-49HR]. 
206. Cf. Liza H. Gold, Addressing Bias in the Forensic Assessment of Sexual Harassment Claims, 
26 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 563, 563 (1998). 
207. See Eliza G.C. Collins & Timothy B. Blodgett, Sexual Harassment . . . Some See It . . . Some 
Won’t, HARV. BUS. REV. (March 1981), https://hbr.org/1981/03/sexual-harassmentsome-see-itsome-
wont [https://perma.cc/6SLX-7798 ]; Gutek & Koss, supra note 163, at 44. 
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prove because even neutral procedures can produce biased results. Context matters. 
If women are relatively powerless within a particular institution or workplace, their 
complaints may be more likely to trigger retaliation.208 Moreover, investigations are 
often carried out without the safeguards necessary to ensure fairness such as 
specialized training for the investigator.209 Finally, the desire to avoid disrupting the 
work environment may also undercut the employer’s skill at handling internal 
investigations.210 Many of the problems faced by employers in investigating their 
own employees may be solved by deferring to neutral third-parties, but this is  
rarely done.211 
The problems with internal dispute resolution are exacerbated by a legal 
regime that has no mechanism for measuring success—nor makes any attempt to 
do so. Employers might adopt better policies—or spend more time studying 
whether their existing policies work—if the law penalized them for failing to 
prevent or respond to sexual harassment appropriately. But there is reason for 
skepticism about internal investigations, even if the law spurred employers to work 
harder at maintaining a just system. The overriding purpose of antidiscrimination 
laws such as Title VII is to prevent discrimination in the workplace. Sociologists 
have raised important questions about whether any internal dispute resolution 
system is up to the task. Lauren Edelman, Howard Erlanger, and John Lande 
studied internal dispute resolution (IDR) systems to assess the extent to which they 
serve as an adequate substitute for legal processes.212 One concern they identified 
is that employers have an interest in resolving grievances without necessarily naming 
the problem as discrimination or preventing it from recurring.213 The law, these 
researchers found, plays a relatively small role in the internal handling of 
complaints.214 Internal investigation handlers tend to recast discrimination as a 
managerial problem.215 This permits the conflict to be addressed without “labeling 
and condemning discrimination where it does in fact exist.”216 But the renaming can 
harm the interest in redress of the target and fail to deter similar behavior in the 
future. The flaws these researchers have identified are significant enough to raise 
questions about whether the law should require or even encourage the internal 
resolution of discrimination complaints, rather than permitting targets to take their 
grievances immediately to the legal system. 
 
208. See Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures, 46  
AM. PSYCH. 497, 500 (1991). 
209. See, e.g., Mark L. Lengnick-Hall, Checking Out Sexual Harassment Claims, HR  
MAG., Mar. 1992, at 77, 81; see also Dorfman et al., supra note 199, at 33. 
210. See Costello, supra note 201, at 17–18. 
211. See Day, supra note 202, at 106; Susan Gardner & Kathryn Lewis, Sexual Harassment 
Investigations: A Portrait of Contradictions, SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J., Autumn 2000, at 29, 33. 
212. See Edelman et al., supra note 203. 
213. See id. at 499–500. 
214. Id. at 500. 
215. Id. at 511. 
216. Id. at 516. One caveat to this finding is that the authors found complaint handlers “most 
likely to recognize discrimination in sexual harassment cases.” Id. at 523. 
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2. Omitted Measures 
While it is easy to catalog the flaws in the measures that are most commonly 
taken by organizations in their efforts to navigate sexual harassment liability, our 
time might be better spent focusing on the measure they have no incentive to take 
—but which might work. The law pays no attention at all to organizational culture, 
ignores ties between harassment and gender equity more generally, and is  
ill-equipped to deal with avoidance practices that men sometimes lapse into in 
response to increased enforcement of sexual harassment law. 
Decades of research into sexual harassment confirm that organizational 
culture is a strong correlate with levels of harassment. “[Organizational] [c]limate is 
an important driver of harassment because it is the norms of the workplace; it 
basically guides employees . . . to know what to do when no one is watching.”217 
Organizational factors relate to the workplace environment rather than the 
characteristics of any particular individual who works there. Organizational culture 
is defined as “the collectively held beliefs, assumptions, and values held by 
organizational members.”218 Organizational climate is the “shared perceptions 
within an organization of the policies, practices, and procedures in place (i.e., why 
they are in place; how people experience them; how they are implemented; what 
behaviors in the organization are rewarded, supported, and expected.)”219 
Organizational culture and climate work in tandem—the climate reflects the culture, 
and the culture shapes the climate. 
The impact of leader behavior on the organizational culture and climate holds 
true in the context of sexual harassment. Studies show that managers’ attitudes of 
harassment positively correlate with the level of harassment.220 Even more relevant 
to many recent #MeToo scandals, situations in which those in power share sexist 
views and engage in sexually harassing behavior can facilitate and encourage others 
to engage in sexually harassing behavior.221 Studies show, for example, that men 
 
217. Select Task Force Meeting of June 15, 2015 – Workplace Harassment: Examining the 
Scope of the Problem and Potential Solutions, Written Testimony of Mindy Bergman, Associate 
Professor of Psychology, Texas A&M University, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n (June 15, 
2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/written-testimony-mindy-bergman-associate-professor-psychology-
texas-am-university [https://perma.cc/6SK9-ELDA]. 
218. Cailin S. Stamarski & Leanne S. Son Hing, Gender Inequalities in the Workplace: The Effects 
of Organizational Structures, Processes, Practices, and Decision Makers’ Sexism, 6 FRONTIERS  
PSYCH., no. 1400, Sept. 2015, at 1, 7; see also Marion McCollom, Book Review, 19  
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836, 836 (1994) (reviewing HARRISON M. TRICE & JANICE M. BEYER, THE 
CULTURE OF WORK ORGANIZATIONS (1993)); EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
AND LEADERSHIP 219 (4th ed. 2010). 
219. NASEM, supra note 68 at 121; Isis H. Settles, Lilia M. Cortina, Janet Malley & Abigail  
J. Stewart, The Climate for Women in Academic Science: The Good, the Bad, and the Changeable, 30  
PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 47, 48 (2006). 
220. Pryor et al., supra note 173, at 70. 
221. Inez Dekker & Julian Barling, Personal and Organizational Predictors of Workplace Sexual 
Harassment of Women by Men, 3 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCH. 7, 7–8 (1998); Elissa L. Perry, 
Carol T. Kulik & James M. Schmidtke, Individual Differences in the Effectiveness of Sexual Harassment 
Awareness Training, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 698, 702 (1998); Pryor et al., supra note 173, at 79. 
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with a high propensity to sexually harass women are even more likely to harass after 
witnessing an authority figure engage in sexually exploitative behavior.222 Surveys 
of particular workplace environments confirm this effect. For example, a survey 
conducted by the Department of Defense showed that a higher percentage of 
harassing incidents occurred where the commanding officer was deemed to 
encourage harassment.223 Another study found that the viewing of a sexist film 
increased the likelihood that the less sexist men would engage in gender 
harassment.224 Men who are shown a video portraying successful women in STEM 
fields are less likely to send unsolicited sex jokes or to profess a willingness to 
engage in sexual coercion than men who are shown sexist TV clips.225 As the 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) report 
observes based on available research, 
[A] person that has proclivities for sexual harassment will have those 
behaviors greatly inhibited when exposed to role models who behave in a 
professional way as compared with role models who behave in a harassing 
way, or when in an environment that does not support harassing behaviors 
and/or has strong consequences for these behaviors.226 
Studies show that the converse is also true—men are less likely to engage in 
sexual harassment when those behaviors are not exhibited or condoned by authority 
figures in the workplace.227 While leaders at the top have great influence on the 
organization’s culture, managers throughout the hierarchy also influence the climate 
and culture.228 
All of this is complicated by an additional wrinkle—it is difficult for employers 
to address misconduct by executives. The internal grievance structures are least 
likely to effectively resolve the problems created by an executive’s misconduct, and 
those with oversight such as board members or other executives are likely to be 
hesitant to take action against high-ranking executives, especially the CEO, for fear 
of damaging the operational side of the business, the company’s reputation, or the 
career of a colleague who they might otherwise hold in high regard. The recent 
scandals involving Harvey Weinstein, Roger Ailes, and Les Moonves illustrate these 
 
222. Pryor et al., supra note 173, at 79. 
223. DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DMDC REP. NO. 96-014, 1995 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY (1996); Pryor et al., supra note 173, at 71. 
224. Robert T. Hitlan, John B. Pryor, Matthew S. Hesson-McInnis & Michael Olson, 
Antecedents of Gender Harassment: An Analysis of Person and Situation Factors, 61 SEX ROLES 794,  
799 (2009). 
225. Anne Maass, Mara Cadinu & Silvia Galdi, Sexual Harassment: Motivations and 
Consequences, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GENDER AND PSYCHOLOGY 341, 350 (Michelle K. Ryan 
& Nyla R. Branscombe eds., 2013). 
226. NASEM, supra note 68, at 46. 
227. Pryor et al., supra note 173, at 80. 
228. Settles et al., supra note 219, at 48. 
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challenges, as well as the very serious risks of not addressing executive  
sexual misconduct.229 
An organization’s climate is by far the most significant predictor of 
harassment. Research makes clear that workplace norms influence both the level of 
harassment and how victims respond to it.230 Organizational culture, which both 
reflects and can reinforce societal culture, can play a role in facilitating or 
suppressing sexual harassment. Industrial organization scholars suggest 
that sexual harassment is “the result of certain opportunity structures created by 
organizational climate, hierarchy, and specific authority relations.”231 This means, 
in effect, that men have more opportunity to victimize women given the “prevailing 
organizational structure in our society, in which most positions of authority are held 
by men, who often practice their power and exploit their organizational positions 
for sexual profit.”232 This might explain why sexual harassment levels are higher in 
traditionally male occupations.233 Harassment can also be explained in part by 
 
229. See, e.g., Kantor & Twohey, Sexual Misconduct Claims Trail a Hollywood Mogul, supra note 
3; Twohey & Chokshi, supra note 6. On the scandals at Fox News, see, for example, Grossman, supra 
note 7; Creswell et al., supra note 24; Rutenberg, supra note 56 (exploring the ways in which Bill O’Reilly, 
Harvey Weinstein, Bill Cosby, and others were able to keep “their alleged misconduct under wraps with 
the help of the nondisclosure agreements included as part of the numerous out-of-court settlements 
that allowed them to admit no wrongdoing”); Rachel Abrams & Edmund Lee, Les Moonves  
Obstructed Investigation into Misconduct Claims, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/business/media/les-moonves-cbs-report.html [https:// 
perma.cc/W4PJ-26WY]. 
230. Matthew S. Hesson-McInnis & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: A Preliminary 
Test of an Integrative Model, 27 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 877 (1997); Sandra S. Tangri, Martha R. Burt 
& Leanor B. Johnson, Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explanatory Models, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES 33, 
37–38 (1982); Lach & Gwartney-Gibbs, supra note 190, at 108–09; Mary Sullivan & Deborah I. Bybee, 
Female Students and Sexual Harassment: What Factors Predict Reporting Behavior?, 50 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
FOR WOMEN DEANS ADM’RS & COUNS. 11 (1987); Chelsea R. Willness, Piers Steel & Kibeom Lee,  
A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Consequents of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 60  
PERS. PSYCH. 127 (2007); Dekker & Barling, supra note 221, at 8; Theresa M. Glomb, Wendy  
L. Richman, Charles L. Hulin, Fritz Drasgow, Kimberly T. Schneider & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Ambient 
Sexual Harassment: An Integrated Model of Antecedents and Consequences, 71 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 309, 322–23 (1997); Hitlan et al., supra note 224. 
231. Tangri et al., supra note 230, at 34; see also Jeanette N. Cleveland & Melinda E. Kerst, Sexual 
Harassment and Perceptions of Power: An Under-Articulated Relationship, 42 J. VOCATIONAL  
BEHAV. 49, 63 (1993). 
232. Azy Barak, Yael Pitterman & Rivi Yitzhaki, An Empirical Test of the Role of Power 
Differential in Originating Sexual Harassment, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 497, 498 (1995) (citing 
Tangri et al., supra note 230, at 37–38); see also Chamallas, supra note 105, at 40 n.10 (describing 
Catharine MacKinnon’s theory of sexual harassment as structuralist, stressing that “women are 
susceptible to harassment because of occupational segregation, a situation in which most women 
occupy low status, low paying jobs and tend to be supervised by men”); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories 
About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases 
Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (1990) (employing similar 
structuralist approach to analyzing sex inequality in the workplace). 
233. See Gruber, supra note 172, at 314 (finding that “[g]ender predominance is an important 
predictor of both physical threat and sexual materials”); James E. Gruber, The Sexual Harassment 
Experiences of Women in Nontraditional Jobs: Results from Cross-National Research, PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX AND POWER IN THE WORKPLACE: A CONFERENCE TO 
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sociocultural theory. Gendered power differentials in society as a whole can 
contribute to sexual harassment in the workplace. Under this theory, 
sexual harassment is 
an abuse of the powerful over the powerless. Because of the patriarchal 
structure of our society and culture, men (who are more likely to be 
powerholders) are more likely than women to sexually harass. And women, 
who are more likely to be powerless, are more likely than men to 
be sexually harassed.234 
Drawing on this theory, feminist theorists describe sexual harassment as only 
“one manifestation of a pervasive cultural enforcement of gender 
inequality.”235 This approach focuses on the ways in which men are socialized into 
“domineering sexual behaviors” and women are socialized into complementary 
passive and acquiescent roles.236 A variety of data points reinforce this explanation 
for sexual harassment, including the disproportionately high number of male 
harassers and female victims, as well as the high rates of harassment in workplaces 
with a big disparity in the number of men and women employed.237 Although we 
know that power plays a significant role in the occurrence of sexual misconduct, we 
know little about how to predict its consequences beyond that most harassers will 
be male and most targets will be female.238 But if we dismantle the gender hierarchy 
that continues to form society’s scaffolding, we may find that it ameliorates the 
problem of sexual misconduct at the same time. 
If one wanted to make predictions about the likelihood that sexual misconduct 
might occur in a particular workplace, one would look at studies correlating 
harassment with certain types of organizational environments. This offers more 
promise than an in-depth analysis of the causes of harassment. Studies, for example, 
have found a correlation between sexual harassment and measurable variables such 
as the “visibility and contact in sex-integrated jobs; the sex ratio; occupational 
 
PROMOTE WOMEN AND MEN WORKING PRODUCTIVELY TOGETHER 128 (1992); Edward 
Lafontaine & Leslie Tredeau, The Frequency, Sources, and Correlates of Sexual Harassment Among 
Women in Traditional Male Occupations, 15 SEX ROLES 433, 441 (1986); Robert E. Niebuhr & Wiley  
R. Boyles, Sexual Harassment of Military Personnel: An Examination of Power Differentials, 15 INT’L  
J. INTERCULTURAL RELS. 445, 452 (1991). 
234. Stockdale, supra note 83, at 96; see also Barak et al., supra note 232, at 498–99 
(describing harassment as “basically a product of norms, values, stereotypes, myths, and general 
relevant expectations and beliefs that prevail in Western society, which generally delineate male 
dominance over women”). 
235. Tangri et al., supra note 230, at 35; see also Barak et al., supra note 232, at 499 (describing the 
“sexual harassment phenomenon chiefly as an exhibition of attempts of male dominance to overpower 
females and emphasiz[ing] female subordination and even ownership”); Nicholas Davidson, Feminism 
and Sexual Harassment, 28 SOC’Y 39, 41 (1991) (describing feminist definition of sexual harassment by 
reference to the presumption “that the man holds power with which he is able to coerce the woman 
[to submit to sexual advances]”). 
236. See Tangri et al., supra note 230, at 40. 
237. Id. at 41. 
238. Id. at 40–41. 
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norms; one’s job function; and availability of grievance procedures and  
job alternatives.”239 
There has also been important work done in understanding the connection 
between workplace norms and sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is more likely 
in highly sexualized work environments, male-dominated work environments, and 
work environments in which the employers exercise little or no control over 
behavior.240 The level of harassment is also inversely correlated with perceived 
equal employment opportunity.241 Harassment will flourish in workplaces in which 
there is simply a norm of employer tolerance or even subtle encouragement 
of harassing behavior.242 Studies also show that “norms set by local management 
importantly contribute to the occurrence of sexual harassment”; in other words, 
there is a correlation between whether management effectively reacts to sexual 
harassment and whether it continues to occur.243 If “top management 
condones sexual harassment by ignoring it, discouraging complaints, or 
participating in it, then those disposed to sexually harass will be likely to do so.”244 
An empirical study by Elizabeth O’Hare and William O’Donohue used a  
four-factor model for predicting and explaining sexual harassment and found that 
the strongest risk factors for harassment were “a lack of knowledge about grievance 
procedures for sexual harassment, an unprofessional atmosphere, and the existence 
of sexist attitudes in the workplace.”245 
This research on organizational factors that contribute to harassment is so 
important to understanding the predicament unearthed by the 2017 #MeToo 
movement. The law has utterly failed to capture this aspect of organizational 
behavior. The law is designed neither to measure organizational culture nor to 
reward or punish an employer for the culture they have fostered (or failed to foster). 
Culture doesn’t fit within the rules of liability that are premised on identifying a bad 
actor and determining the employer’s level of culpability in facilitating that actor’s 
misconduct. This approach might overpenalize an institution that maintains a strong 
egalitarian culture but is stunned by an outlier’s misconduct, but likewise, it is likely 
to miss the many subtle things an institution might do to egg on or overlook the 
behavior of many in its midst. Leadership and accountability are the two most 
 
239. Id. at 38–40 (predicting identity of victims and harassers, and level of harassment, based 
on varying organizational factors). 
240. See id. (explaining the role of local norms and employer control in fostering  
sexual harassment). 
241. See Lafontaine & Tredeau, supra note 233, at 441. 
242. See Pryor et al., supra note 173, at 78 (applying the concept of “behavioral contagion” 
to sexual harassment); id. at 70 (concluding, based on survey data, that “sexual harassment seems to be 
more likely to occur when local norms permit such behavior”). 
243. Id. at 73. 
244. Id. at 80; see also Theresa M. Glomb, Liberty J. Munson, Charles L. Hulin, Mindy  
E. Bergman & Fritz Drasgow, Structural Equation Models of Sexual Harassment: Longitudinal 
Explorations and Cross-Sectional Generalizations, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 14, 26 (1999) (finding a 
relationship between organizational tolerance and sexual harassment). 
245. O’Hare & O’Donohue, supra note 83, at 576. 
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significant movers of organizational culture. Values and culture come from the top, 
but they do not survive without reinforcement at every level with concrete actions. 
As the research proves, policies and procedures are not self-executing; effective 
enforcement is what matters. Well-handled complaints can help improve an 
egalitarian and anti-harassment culture; poorly handled ones can diminish it. The 
key characteristics of an organization with permissive attitudes toward harassment 
are (1) perceived risk to targets for complaining, (2) a perceived lack of sanctions 
against offenders, and (3) the perception that one’s complaints will not be taken 
seriously.246 Organizational tolerance is associated with higher levels of all three 
types of sexual harassment discussed in Section I. Indeed, the “degree to which a 
particular organization’s climate is seen by those in the organization as permissive 
of sexual harassment has the strongest relationship with how much sexual 
harassment occurs in the organization.”247 One meta-analysis that combined data 
from forty-one studies (covering almost 70,000 survey respondents) found the 
perception of organizational tolerance of harassment to be the single best predictor 
of sexual harassment in a workplace.248 Studies clearly show that the level of 
enforcement of a company’s policies affects the incidence of harassment.249 Yet, the 
quality of enforcement measures is the aspect least captured by the rules of 
employer liability. The Faragher/Ellerth rules are not a good fit for measuring these 
institutional qualities. If one were to sum up the flaws in the current system in a 
single phrase, “lack of accountability” might well be the most apt one. As the 
president of Federally Employed Women said of a report about the mishandling of 
sexual misconduct complaints at the Department of Justice, “What is alarming 
about the Civil Division and what rings true for the entire labor force is the lack of 
accountability for individuals committing acts of sexual misconduct due to the 
absence of punitive procedures.”250 
The second gaping omission in sexual harassment law involves the horizontal 
and vertical integration of women in the workplace—up and down the scale within 
an employer’s hierarchy and across the occupational spectrum. Researchers have 
always known—and been able to prove—that sexual harassment does not occur 
separate and apart from other types of gender inequity. Sexual harassment is more 
common in work forces with poor gender integration. As Catharine MacKinnon 
has observed, the “dynamics of inequality have preserved the system in which the 
more power a man has, the more sexual access he can get away with compelling.”251 
People with highly stereotyped attitudes about gender score higher on the 
 
246. NASEM, supra note 68, at 47; see also Charles L. Hulin, Louise F. Fitzgerald & Fritz 
Drasgow, Organizational Influences on Sexual Harassment, in 5 SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE 
WORKPLACE: PERSPECTIVES, FRONTIERS, AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES 127, 129–30 (Margaret  
S. Stockdale ed., 1996). 
247. NASEM, supra note 68, at 121; Willness, supra note 230. 
248. Willness et al., supra note 230. 
249. Pryor et al., supra note 173, at 72. 
250. Davidson, supra note 9, at 2. 
251. MacKinnon, supra note +. 
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“likelihood to sexually harass” scale.252 Victims are less likely to complain about 
harassment when they are greatly outnumbered by men at work. Women of color 
are more likely to be harassed than white women. These are just a few of the data 
points that show the interrelationship between sexual harassment and other types 
of inequality. But one side effect of the #MeToo movement is that other stories of 
racial and gender inequality may gain more traction. Recent surveys show that the 
vast majority of respondents believe sexual harassment is more symptomatic of 
widespread problems in society than the product of individual bad actors, and most 
agree that while the issue of sexual harassment is very important, sexual harassment 
is just one symptom of a larger set of gender problems.253 If one looks, there is 
plenty to see. Occupational segregation remains entrenched; the gender wage gap is 
stark and hasn’t lessened much since the 1980s; women do not advance at the same 
rates in most occupations nor reach the same heights as their male counterparts; 
and studies abound showing the persistence of implicit and explicit bias in addition 
to the vestiges of past discrimination. The fact that there are more CEOs of large 
companies named John than there are women (of any name) is telling.254 And 
perhaps the first step is to understand that sexual harassment is part and parcel of 
a broader system of gender inequity. We would do better to tackle the many ways 
in which working women labor unequally—in every respect from pay to 
advancement to biased evaluation—before narrowing our focus to sexual 
misconduct. But, again, the law sees no connection between sexual harassment and 
gender equity and is woefully inadequate for addressing gender equity alone. 
A third omission is the law’s failure to grapple with gender avoidance practices. 
The increased pressure and escalated discipline for sexual misconduct come with 
gender sidelining—minimizing the risk of a sexual harassment accusation by 
limiting contact at work with women. The #MeToo movement has been followed 
in short order by “backlash against backlash,” because “power does not willingly 
cede its clout.”255 The practice of avoiding women at work is well-documented and 
has become more pervasive in the #MeToo era. A survey by the Harvard Business 
Review found that sixty-four percent of male executives expressed reluctance to meet 
one-on-one with junior female colleagues; a New York Times survey discovered that 
forty-five percent of men felt it inappropriate to dine alone with a female coworker, 
and twenty-two percent thought the same of attending a meeting alone with a 
 
252. See Stockdale, supra note 83, at 84, 86. 
253. John Gramlich, 10 Things We Learned About Gender Issues in the U.S. in 2017, PEW  
RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/12/28/10-
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more extended analysis, see generally JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, NINE TO FIVE: HOW GENDER, SEX, 
AND SEXUALITY CONTINUE TO DEFINE THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2016). 
254. Claire Cain Miller, Kevin Quealy & Margot Sanger-Katz, The Top Jobs Where Women Are 
Outnumbered by Men Named John, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/04/24/upshot/women-and-men-named-john.html [https://perma.cc/W7L5-86BW]. 
255. Kingsolver, supra note 43. 
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female coworker.256 Studies also suggest that this behavior has increased specifically 
to avoid the perception of harassment.257 Such practices clearly violate Title VII 
when they affect women’s work opportunities, yet they are both pervasive and hard 
to prove. Gender sidelining is likely to be most damaging in careers where success 
depends on networking, mentoring, or business-building. Moreover, the premise on 
which men often admit to avoidance behaviors—that they are worried about false 
accusations—is unfounded. Survey data shows that false reports of harassment and 
other types of sexual misconduct are extremely uncommon but that false denials of 
improper conduct are extremely high. The estimated rate of false reports of rape 
and sexual assault are between two to ten percent.258 The estimates for false reports 
of sexual harassment in the workplace are as low or lower.259 Employers surveyed 
report that at most two to three percent of sexual harassment complaints are false.260 
The rate of false reports is so low at least in part because coming forward with an 
allegation of sexual harassment is not costless. Employees who voice such 
complaints risk retaliation, social ostracization, and other types of adverse 
consequences.261 Moreover, research shows that truly false reports—allegations of 
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HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 8, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/10/as-a-leader-create-a-culture-of-
sponsorship [https://perma.cc/P84H-7JMY]; Claire Cain Miller, It’s Not Just Mike Pence. Americans 
Are Wary of Being Alone with the Opposite Sex., N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT ( July 1, 2017), https://
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conduct that did not happen—are usually easy to ferret out during the course of a 
proper investigation.262 True claims may be unsubstantiated, or true but not in 
violation of any relevant laws or policies, but those are also determinations that 
cannot be made without a full investigation. 
CONCLUSION 
There can be no doubt that the #MeToo movement has shifted the societal 
terrain. It provoked new, if uncomfortable, conversations and provided a common 
language for talking about a pervasive problem, even if it did not unite a critical 
mass around common goals. It capitalized on the unsung work of activists of color, 
who had laid the groundwork for collective action, forcing a painful realization that 
it was not until famous white woman sounded the alarm that many rose up to 
support them. As actress Gabrielle Union pointed out, “I don’t think it’s a 
coincidence whose pain has been taken seriously. Whose pain we have showed 
historically and continued to show. Whose pain is tolerable and whose pain is 
intolerable. And whose pain needs to be addressed now.”263 
Whatever the spark, the #MeToo movement has also increased polarization 
in our already divided country, an effect that was seen in voter views of Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh’s confirmation to the Supreme Court in the face of a credible allegation 
of sexual assault. But institutions like employers and universities do not have the 
luxury of just digging in on one pole or the other. As they struggle to compete in a 
complex world, they must respond to the #MeToo movement and the ways in 
which it has challenged business-as-usual practices. 
The 2017 #MeToo movement is a stark reminder that the legal regime is 
imperfect—and certainly not omnipotent. We have invested great faith in the 
development of legal doctrine while ignoring the persistence of the problem. To a 
certain degree, this state of affairs was predictable. From an institutional perspective, 
sexual harassment has always been treated like a legal problem, but its roots are so 
much deeper. As Catherine MacKinnon pointed out, “It is widely thought that when 
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something is legally prohibited, it more or less stops.”264 But, she continued, “[t]his 
may be true for exceptional acts, but it is not true for pervasive practices like sexual 
harassment, including rape, that are built into structural social hierarchies.”265 
Employers manage their risk of being sued for sexual harassment much like they 
manage their risk of a workers’ compensation claim or a fire or any type of lawsuit. 
Sexual harassment is bad, in this world view, because it might lead someone to bring 
a lawsuit under Title VII or some other applicable antidiscrimination statute. What 
that translates to in practice is a set of precautionary and reactive measures that align 
closely with the rules of liability for sexual harassment. Employers turn to policies, 
procedures, and training as the means of preventing and responding to sexual 
harassment because those are the things that courts reward when assessing liability. 
The rule-compliance that has become the benchmark by which employers and 
victims are measured is a fatal flaw. Susan Bisom-Rapp has described this problem 
with respect to antidiscrimination law generally as “masking rather than eliminating 
workplace bias.”266 The liability rules in place overlook the significant control 
employers exercise over the workplace and their ability to establish norms of respect 
and equality, to respond to problems in a manner that both resolves them and 
encourages future victims to come forward, and to discipline offenders. Forty years 
into this adventure, there can be no doubt that very good rule-compliance can 
coexist with startling levels of harassment and untold consequences for women’s 
equal employment opportunity. 
With a liability-minimizing approach, institutions reduce the number of 
lawsuits and increase the chance of success when they are filed. The win rate for 
plaintiffs in discrimination cases is lower than for all other civil causes of action. 
Moreover, if the strategy fails—and an institution is found liable for  
harassment—the worst-case scenario is often not that bad for the employer.267 
Under Title VII, damages are capped at low rates that have not risen since first 
enacted in 1991. Under Title IX, damages are not capped, but the threshold for 
liability is set so high that it is virtually impossible for a plaintiff to prevail against 
an educational institution in a sexual harassment case. We overestimate the degree 
to which law can change culture.268 Civil rights laws often have the effect of making 
overt discrimination covert. That allowed us to believe that harassment was 
becoming less common—and we became complacent. The stories and scandals that 
emerged as a result of the #MeToo movement have broken that spell but do not 
provide an obvious way forward. 
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The landscape has shifted, however, perhaps seismically. Those uncontrollable 
forces, which threaten significant reputational and economic harm, may prove to 
get employers to refocus on preventing and responding to harassment rather than 
on the meaningless proxies the law encourages. In a better world, employers would 
assess the prevalence and nature of harassment in their own workplaces before 
identifying the strategies and efforts most likely to address their version of the 
problem and its dire consequences for women. Most importantly, employers might 
have an incentive to evaluate their efforts—and pivot if the results  
are disappointing. 
There are many obstacles to change in the sexual harassment context. A core 
problem is that the typical employer’s approach to preventing and correcting 
harassment relies on victim reporting—a system endorsed and incentivized by the 
Supreme Court in a series of cases about sexual harassment liability. But most 
harassment victims do not report incidents of harassment to an authority figure 
inside or outside the workplace. Reporting is, in fact, the least common response of 
women who experience harassment—something only eight to fifteen percent of 
them do. Increasing reporting is no easy task, however. Women who do not report 
harassment cite futility—the belief that nothing will be done to fix the  
situation—and the fear of retaliation as their primary reasons for keeping quiet. 
When a woman makes this calculation and concludes that the benefits of reporting 
are outweighed by the costs, she is often right. Studies show that discrimination 
victims who file formal complaints end up worse off than those who don’t. 
The #MeToo movement may address the futility concern, since employers 
feel greater pressure to take action in response to complaints—and might be held 
accountable at least by the public if the measures they take are merely calculated to 
minimize liability rather than to stop the harassment from recurring with the same 
or other victims. But it is too soon to tell. In addition to the greater number of 
firings noted in the recent study, there is other evidence that business-as-usual 
might not be tolerated as much in the future. While #MeToo may have triggered 
backlash, it has also induced many people to believe women (itself now a saying and 
hashtag). The movement is “eroding the two biggest barriers to ending sexual 
harassment in law and in life: the disbelief and trivializing dehumanization of  
its victims.”269 
The movement has also spurred institutions to take a close look at their own 
practices and propose or mandate reform. Google and Facebook, for example, 
voluntarily eliminated forced arbitration for sexual harassment claims.270 The ABA 
 
269. MacKinnon, supra note +. 
270. See Jena McGregor, Google and Facebook Ended Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment 
Claims. Why More Companies Could Follow., WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2018, 1:42 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/12/google-facebook-ended-forced-arbitration-sex-
harassment-claims-why-more-companies-could-follow/ [https://perma.cc/V75T-8FHT]; see also 
Terri Gerstein, Opinion, End Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment. Then Do More., N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/opinion/arbitration-google-facebook-
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House of Delegates passed a resolution urging a variety of changes in legal 
profession employers.271 The National Academies of Science, Engineering, and 
Medicine has just published a comprehensive and wide-ranging report on the 
nature, prevalence, and consequences of sexual harassment in academia.272 Other 
professions and academic associations have redefined professional misconduct to 
include sexual harassment. It’s too early to take stock of the changes because the 
lasting and effective ones might be few and far between. But it is safe to say that 
sexual harassment is being taken more seriously by a variety of institutional players. 
The #MeToo movement has brought more attention to sexual harassment, to 
be sure, and spurred some efforts to quantify the problem across different 
industries.273 In addition to changes in awareness, the movement has provoked 
some changes in state law already.274 Thirteen states, for example, have banned or 
 
employment.html [https://perma.cc/8JT4-LN9B]. The problem of sexism and sexual misconduct in 
big tech is an open secret. See, e.g., Lerman, supra note 205. 
271. See ABA House of Delegates, Resolution 107B (2019), https://www.americanbar.org/
news/reporter_resources/midyear-meeting-2019/house-of-delegates-resolutions/107b [https://web. 
archive.org/web/20201031085359/https://www.americanbar.org/news/reporter_resources/midyear 
-meeting-2019/house-of-delegates-resolutions/107b/] [https://perma.cc/4B4H-J7JT].  
272. See NASEM, supra note 68. 
273. See, e.g., WORKING MOTHER RSCH. INST., #METOO WORKPLACE STUDY (2018); ELYSE 
SHAW, ARIANE HEGEWISCH, M. PHIL & CYNTHIA HESS, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RSCH., SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT AT WORK: UNDERSTANDING THE COSTS (2018); “A Movement, Not a 
Moment”: Lessons from the Fair Food Program for the Growing Fight Against Sexual Harassment and 
Assault in the Workplace, COAL. IMMOKALEE WORKERS ( Jan. 2, 2018), http://ciw-online.org/blog/
2018/01/in-these-times-sexual-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/JR4N-GTN6]; Alexia Fernández 
Campbell, Housekeepers and Nannies Have No Protection from Sexual Harassment Under Federal Law, 
VOX (Apr. 26, 2018, 1:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/26/17275708/housekeepers-nannies-
sexual-harassment-laws [https://perma.cc/8QG9-WYL8]; Jocelyn Frye, Not Just the Rich and  
Famous: The Pervasiveness of Sexual Harassment Across Industries Affects All Workers, CTR. FOR  
AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 20, 2017, 4:59 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/
2017/11/20/443139/not-just-rich-famous/ [https://perma.cc/F22K-9GVM]; ROSSIE ET  
AL., supra note 87; LAUREN SUGERMAN, CHI. WOMEN IN TRADES, #METOO IN TRADITIONALLY 
MALE-DOMINATED OCCUPATIONS: PREVENTING AND ADDRESSING SEXUAL HARASSMENT (2018); 
EDISON RSCH. & MARKETPLACE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: #METOO, WOMEN, 
MEN, AND THE GIG ECONOMY (2018); Katherine Yon Ebright, Taking #MeToo Seriously in the Legal 
Profession, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 57 (2019). 
274. See generally Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103  
MINN. L. REV. 229 (2018); L. Camille Hébert, Is “MeToo” Only a Social Movement or a Legal Movement 
Too?, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 321 (2018); Erik A. Christiansen, How Are the Laws Sparked by 
#MeToo Affecting Workplace Harassment?, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 8, 2020), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/featured-articles/2020/new-
state-laws-expand-workplace-protections-sexual-harassment-victims/ [https://perma.cc/A5ZA-
DRNK]. See also MacKinnon, supra note + (“Taking #MeToo’s changing norms into the law  
could—and predictably will—transform the law as well. Some practical steps could help capture this 
moment. Institutional or statutory changes could include prohibitions or limits on various forms of 
secrecy and nontransparency that hide the extent of sexual abuse and enforce survivor isolation, such 
as forced arbitration, silencing nondisclosure agreements even in cases of physical attacks and multiple 
perpetration, and confidential settlements.”). 
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restricted nondisclosure agreements that cover sexual misconduct.275 Some states 
have extended their statute of limitations for filing a sexual harassment claim.276 
Seven states changed their labor laws to guarantee tipped employees full minimum 
wage before tips, in recognition of the vulnerability of service workers to sexual 
misconduct.277 Five states have also extended their sexual harassment law to cover 
independent contractors.278 There have been no changes yet on the federal level. 
The BE HEARD Act, which would introduce wide-ranging changes to bolster 
protections against workplace harassment, was proposed in May of 2019 but has 
not moved past its initial introduction in the House.279 
These early reforms only scratch the surface of changes that might improve 
the law’s efficacy in addressing sexual misconduct in the workplace. The #MeToo 
movement should inspire us to revisit sexual harassment law—the once great hope 
for equalizing the workplace—more broadly. Sandra Sperino and Suja Thomas 
make a compelling case, for example, that the definition of sexual harassment itself 
is part of the problem, as courts have used the “severe or pervasive” element of 
existing doctrine to excuse all but the most extreme forms of harassment.280 A few 
states have eliminated or modified this requirement in response to the #MeToo 
movement.281 As discussed at great length above, the rules of liability for harassment 
conceal many land mines for victims and too many safe harbors for employers. We 
could revisit known legal obstacles like Title VII’s short statute of limitations, the 
lack of individual liability for harassers, weak protection against retaliation, and so 
 
275. These states include Arizona, California, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey,  
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. See  
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2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); H.R. 679, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019); S. 224, 2018 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). H.R. 360, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2018); S. 75, 101st  
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019); H.R. 707, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018). 
279. See H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Vania Leveille & Lenora M. Lapidus, The BE 
HEARD Act Will Overhaul Workplace Harassment Laws, ACLU (Apr. 10, 2019, 11:15 AM),  
https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-workplace/be-heard-act-will-overhaul-
workplace-harassment-laws [https://perma.cc/84NC-BPBS]. 
280. See Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Opinion, Boss Grab Your Breasts? That’s Not 
(Legally) Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/
harassment-employees-laws-.html [https://perma.cc/V2RF-8MK3]; SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA  
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many others.282 Given the current split in power in the federal government, action 
to address sexual harassment is unlikely. But some states have moved quickly to 
pass laws making it easier for harassment victims to come forward—and harder for 
those credibly accused to hide their behavior. California, by way of example, did 
both. It passed a law granting whistleblower protections to legislative staff members, 
who were unprotected by existing laws that applied to other state employees, after 
revelation of a culture of sexual misconduct in the state legislature.283 It also passed 
a law narrowing the legal use of nondisclosure agreements in cases involving sexual 
harassment or assault.284 New York, California, and Illinois have also passed new 
laws that make sexual harassment training mandatory in some contexts, and 
California created personal liability for harassers.285 Along with questions about 
whether the law has gone far enough are questions about whether, in some respects, 
it has gone too far. This movement provides an opportunity to consider those 
questions as well—and perhaps to rethink what equality and justice require in  
this context.286 
Regardless of whether the law is reformed, employers must now assess the 
risk not only from potential lawsuits, which they have developed a good deal of 
comfort in managing, but also from a variety of other external sources. As discussed 
in Part I, the #MeToo hashtag has been used millions and millions of times; no 
form of social media is immune from #MeToo shares and re-shares. Media stories 
abound about sexual harassment (and sexual harassers), and, in some industries, 
people crowdsource spreadsheets to document harassment. These outlets for 
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survivors create new kinds of threat for employers—scandal, bad press, customer 
boycotts, employee walkouts, drops in ratings, loss of investors, damage to 
recruiting efforts, and so on. These potential consequences of a “#MeToo” 
problem can be both devastating to an institution and difficult to navigate. The 
Twitterverse will not be appeased by revelation of a really solid sexual harassment 
policy in the wake of an exploding scandal; nor will it consider a settlement that 
buys silence as a satisfactory outcome. It is these forces that might, finally, force 
institutions to focus on the problem of sexual harassment directly. Preventing 
harassment will prevent scandal. Adequately addressing complaints of harassment 
will mute outrage. This is why Catharine MacKinnon observed, in the quote at the 
head of this Article, “[T]he #MeToo movement is accomplishing what sexual 
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